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Introduction 
 
The thesis comprises three empirical applications, each investigating different topics related to 
public economics, with a particular attention to the phenomena described as “catastrophic”. Many 
events can be considered catastrophic for an economic setting, such as natural disasters, wars, 
migrations, pandemic diseases, etc. I focus on three of them: catastrophic agglomeration of firms, as a 
response to tax differentials; immigration phenomena, described as catastrophic by the natives; 
catastrophic earthquakes, resulting destructive for both physical and human capital. 
The strong wording that describes these phenomena is not the only thing that they have in common. 
Despite being described as tragic events by the people suffering them, it is not straightforward to find 
evidence of their negative impact in the medium to long-run.  
Catastrophic agglomeration appears dramatic to the jurisdiction that is abandoned by an important 
firm or set of firms, but – in the long-run – firms are simply trying to find the economic conditions that 
allow them to compete and perform better.  
Immigration is often described as a tragedy by the anti-immigrant parties. However, immigrants are 
sometimes the sparkle that ignites the innovation and growth engine. Indeed, many countries, the US in 
primis, have grounded their development on immigration inflows. 
Earthquakes are unpredictable and terrible natural disasters causing dramatic damages and – 
sometimes – asking for a high price in terms of human lives. It would seem immediate to infer that 
physical capital destruction and casualties cannot be an ideal mix to sustain economic growth. 
However, many scholars have found a positive long-term effect of such events. 
In this thesis, I will analyze these phenomena with open eyes, without allowing the priors – that 
every individual inevitably has – to influence my critical judgement. 
In the first chapter, “Catastrophic Agglomeration: Indirect Evidence from the Tax Sensitivity of 
Firm Births?” (with Mario Jametti e Marius Brülhart), I empirically test the existence of a phenomenon 
called “catastrophic agglomeration” by the New Economic Geography literature. In particular, I assess 
whether strong clustering-forces can be triggered by small changes in some underlying parameters, at 
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critical thresholds. Using counts of firm births in 132 industrial sectors in the 213 largest Swiss 
municipalities, I search for evidence for the implied discontinuities in the data, relating the clustering 
intensity of industries to those industries’ sensitivity to differential tax burdens across locations. 
The standard result in the tax competition literature on mobile factors, namely a race-to-the-bottom 
in profit tax rates and a shift of the tax burden to more immobile factors (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 
1986, and Wilson, 1986), has been refined on various fronts both theoretically and empirically in recent 
years. 
One strand of research, the new economic geography (NEG) suggests, on the one hand, that 
agglomeration economies generate rents that can in principle be taxed by the local jurisdiction (Ludema 
and Wooton, 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck and Pflüger, 2006), and, on the other hand, 
agglomeration rents might render firms less sensitive to tax differentials. Using Swiss municipal data, 
Brülhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (BJS, 2012) show that (sectoral) agglomeration forces can indeed 
reduce the tax-sensitivity of new firms in their location decision. However, in their econometric 
specifications the change in the sensitivity to taxation for firm location is considered to be continuous 
and linear, as their coefficient of interest is an interaction term between the level of taxation and a 
measure of sectoral agglomeration. 
Using progressively more flexible estimation strategies, I find that the tax sensitivity of firms’ 
location choices falls off sharply around the 80th percentile of observed agglomeration intensity. This 
result is consistent with the jump discontinuity implied by the theory.  
In the second chapter, “Stop invasion! Immigrants and the rise of populism in Europe” (with 
Massimo Bordignon and Gilberto Turati), I investigate the effects of the presence of immigrants in the 
North of Italy – specifically in Lombardy – which has often been described as “catastrophic” by the 
Northern League, a right-wing political party which has made anti-immigration stances the basis of its 
political platform. Populist parties with an anti-immigrant stance have flourished all around Europe, 
raising questions about the determinants of their success. A great attention has been devoted to the 
effect of immigration on the support for these parties all over Europe, but far less has been paid to the 
channels through which immigration is connected to this political success. I distinguish between the 
“ideological” anti-immigrant channel of the votes from two “rational” channels – crowding-out of 
social services and competition on the labor market – arising from differences in economic features of 
immigrants with respect to Italians. I investigate these channels using a particularly rich dataset on 
Lombardy and taking advantage of the fortuitous coincidence of national and regional elections.  
A positive effect of immigration has been found in Denmark, Germany, Austria and Italy1. 
However, Steinmayr (2016) find a negative effect of refugees on the FPÖ vote share. Mendez and 
                                                          
1 Dustmann et al. (2016), Harmon (2015), Gerdes and Wadensjo (2010) in Denmark; Otto and Steinhardt (2014) in Germany; Halla et al. 
(2016) in Austria; Barone et al. (2014) in Italy. 
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Cutillas (2014) detect no significant effect on support for anti-immigrants coalition in Spain, even 
though they find a positive effect for African immigrants. Becker and Fetzer argue that immigration in 
the UK has fostered the support for UKIP, while Levi et al. (2017) argue that it has only had a short-
run positive effect on Brexit and UKIP’s support, which vanishes over time.  
Thanks to a unique - recently released - dataset, we contribute to the existing literature accounting 
for income (and tax) differentials between immigrants and Italians2 at the municipal level. Lombardy 
constitutes a good socio-economic context for our analyses, having the highest share of immigrant 
population and being amongst the ones with the highest support for the Northern League.  
In the third chapter, “Piling up catastrophes: The economic long term effect of earthquakes” (with 
Matteo Gamalerio), I empirically test the medium and long-term effect of catastrophic earthquakes, i.e. 
the highly destructive ones. In a cross-section framework, I analyze the long-term effect, using a 
particularly rich dataset – at the municipal level – on historic earthquakes in Italy. Moreover, I 
investigate the medium-term effect of earthquakes on economic and social development over the last 
150 years, in a panel framework, thanks to a newly assembled dataset on historical socio-economic data 
about Italian regions.  
The results suggest that in the long-run destructive earthquakes seem to have a positive effect on the 
per-capita municipal disposable income, number of firms per capita and number of non-profit 
organization (a measure often used as a proxy for social capital). In the medium run, only destructive 
earthquakes seem to have a positive effect on the evolution of regional gross domestic product (GDP) 
and value added per capita. In the medium term, catastrophic earthquakes (i.e. the one causing 
casualties) do not seem to affect the evolution of GDP and value added per capita. However, the effect 
on the human development index is not clear cut: destructive earthquakes keep on having a significant 
impact, but – at least in the medium term – catastrophic ones negatively affect the evolution of the 
HDI. As a corollary, we find that the INGV seismicity classification is not very useful to understand 
the effect of earthquakes on the economic development, since it does not account properly for the way 
in which earthquakes lay out their medium and long-term effect on the economic system. 
  
                                                          
2 We carefully avoid the use of the word “natives” because here the discriminating factor is the citizenship, which also gives the right to 
vote. The number of non-natives who have gotten the Italian citizenship in Lombardy now exceeds two hundred and twenty thousand 
individuals, about 20% of the current number of immigrants. 
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Catastrophic Agglomeration: Indirect 
Evidence from the Tax Sensitivity of 
Firm Births 
with  Marius Brülhart, University of Lausanne 
 Mario Jametti, Università della Svizzera italiana 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The standard result in the literature on tax competition with mobile factors, namely a 
race-to-the-bottom in profit tax rates and a shift of the tax burden to more immobile 
factors (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986), has been refined on various fronts, 
both theoretically and empirically, in recent years. One strand of research, the New 
Economic Geography (NEG), suggests, on the one hand, that agglomeration economies 
generate rents that can in principle be taxed by the local jurisdiction (Ludema and Wooton, 
2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck and Pflüger, 2006), and, on the other hand, that 
agglomeration rents might render firms less sensitive to tax differentials.  
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The NEG most famous model, the “core-periphery” model, allows for full 
agglomeration of the mobile sector in a single region – the core – while only the immobile 
sector remains also in the other region – the periphery. In such a setting, a small change in 
the parameters defining the equilibrium might trigger a sudden move of all the firms 
belonging to the mobile sector towards a single location. This phenomenon has been 
defined “catastrophic agglomeration” by Krugman (1991) and later on Baldwin et al. (2001) 
described such “catastrophes” as “perhaps the most celebrated feature of the core-
periphery model”. 
Prior empirical research based on time-series evidence has not been kind to the 
discontinuities implied by the theory, finding economic geography to be highly persistent 
even in the face of large exogenous shocks (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Davis and 
Weinstein, 2008; Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm, 2004). This has led researchers to 
consider “catastrophes” as mainly a theoretical curiosity1. 
Using Swiss municipal data, Brülhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (BJS, 2012) show that 
(sectoral) agglomeration forces can indeed reduce the tax-sensitivity of new firms in their 
location decision. However, in their econometric specifications the change in the sensitivity 
to taxation for firm location is considered to be continuous and linear, as their coefficient 
of interest is an interaction term between the level of taxation and a measure of sectoral 
agglomeration. This result emerges by construction, because their specification allows 
neither for non-linearities nor for catastrophes. 
In this chapter, we extend the BJS result in a number of ways, using the same dataset 
including the 213 largest Swiss municipalities – spread over 132 industrial sectors. The first 
avenue is to explore whether the tax sensitivity of firm location changes non-linearly with 
the degree of sectoral agglomeration. We relax the linearity assumption by estimating, with 
Poisson, some polynomial and spline specifications. The polynomial specifications allow us 
to assess whether there are strong non-linearities linked to sectorial agglomeration. The 
spline specification - even though it forces the relationship to be continuous - lets the 
parameters vary over the range of the agglomeration index. Our estimates suggest that 
there might be structural changes in the right tail of the distribution of the agglomeration 
index: the effect of taxes on new firm births, indeed, gets reversed. 
                                                          
1 According to Head and Mayer (2004, p. 2662), “(c)atastrophes (...) should perhaps be considered more as 
fascinating theoretical 'exotica' rather than as robust elements of economic geography”. Similarly, Combes et 
al. (2008, p. 337) concluded that the “studies undertaken to date seem to converge in invalidating the 
existence of phenomena such as catastrophes”. 
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Further, we allow the tax effect to vary discontinuously with sectoral agglomeration, 
estimating percentile regressions. In order to take seriously the possibility of catastrophic 
outcomes, we consider two parametric, piecewise linear or polynomial specifications, 
allowing for jumps in the effect of taxes. Specifically, we estimate regressions over quintiles 
and deciles of the agglomeration index, in order to verify whether there could be any level 
of it for which there could be a significant jump in the overall effect of taxes. This 
estimation strategy confirms that, if there is any discontinuity, it should take place for high 
values of the agglomeration index. Nonetheless, we are aware that dividing the 
agglomeration index into quintiles or deciles is somehow arbitrary. Hence, we investigate 
whether we find a structural break in the effect of taxes.  
We perform a Quandt test over different percentiles of the observed agglomeration 
index, in order to detect evidence of a potential structural break in the effect of local taxes’ 
differentials. To operationalize this procedure we consider a regression over two sections 
of both the direct effect and the interaction term between the corporate tax rate and the 
agglomeration index. The two sections have a variable length, depending on the value of 
the chosen threshold: we repeat the estimates for each possible threshold between the 16th 
and the 85th percentile of the agglomeration index.  
Our results suggest that the deterrent effect of higher local taxes is fairly stable for the 
lower four fifths of industries by agglomeration intensity, but that this effect is reduced 
abruptly around the 80th percentile. The highly agglomerated sectors are essentially 
insensitive to tax differentials. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
1.2 presents a brief literature overview and motivation for the paper. Section 1.3 introduces 
a theoretical model and section 1.4 describes the data and the empirical methodology. 
Section 1.5 presents the main results and section 1.6 discusses them. Section 1.7 concludes. 
All figures and tables are at the end of the chapter. 
1.2 Literature review 
The presence of agglomeration economies modifies the standard tax competition setting 
among jurisdictions. When local governments compete to attract (or to keep) the mobile 
tax base the existence of agglomeration economies can – in principle – either be a relaxing 
or tightening factor. If they act as a loosening factor the result is a “lumpy” world: 
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agglomeration forces push firms to concentrate in specific jurisdictions, provided that 
restrictions to trade (such as trade costs) are sufficiently low. This phenomenon generate 
rents for firms operating in an agglomerated sector and these rents can be taxed, because 
firms become less sensitive to tax differentials. The most relevant theoretical contributions 
include: Kind et al. (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000), Andersson and Forslid (2003), 
Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Borck and Pflüger (2006), Commendatore et el. (2007), 
Baldwin and Okubo (2009), Feddersen (2010) and Commendatore and Kubin (2013). 
On the other hand, agglomeration economies could exacerbate tax competition, because 
one firm’s decision to relocate might actually cause other firms to mimic it, creating the 
conditions for the formation of a new cluster. In this case, as pointed out by Baldwin et al., 
(2001), and Konrad and Kovenock, (2009), agglomeration economies end up increasing the 
sensitivity of firms to tax differentials. The general prediction of New Economic 
Geography is that the probability that the mobile sector clusters within one region is 
decreasing in the cost of trade and that the greater the agglomeration forces, the lower the 
firms’ sensitivity to tax differentials2.   
Empirical works by Charlot and Paty (2007), Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé (2010 and 
2012), Koh and Riedel (2010), Jofre-Monseny (2011), Lüthy and Schmidheiny (2013) and 
Fréret and Maguin (2017) find that jurisdictions hosting more concentrated sectors actually 
tax more than counterparts hosting firms operating in more dispersed sectors. Moreover 
Fréret and Maguin (2017) point out that even when neighboring jurisdictions lower their 
tax rates, départments with agglomerated sectors react less, by reducing their tax rates less 
than the ones with firms operating in low-agglomeration sectors.  
In their study on plant location in the United Kingdom (UK) Devereux et al. (2007) 
analyze how agglomeration economies affect firms’ sensitivity to local fiscal incentives 
when they choose where to locate. Their results suggest that regions with a bigger pre-
existing stock of plants can attract more easily new plants thanks to their fiscal incentives. 
It is important to highlight that in the UK fiscal incentives are individually negotiated for 
each new plant. Something similar happens in Germany, where Bischoff and Krabel (2017) 
find that municipalities hosting big plants3 tend to set lower corporate tax rates. 
The standard “core-periphery” models do not account for the presence of taxes and 
allow only two possible location outcomes: a completely dispersed one and a completely 
                                                          
2 Cfr. BJS footnote 4, for additional details. 
3 The authors call them “locally dominant firms”, i.e. “firms contributing to a sizeable share to municipalities’ 
revenues”. 
5 
 
agglomerated one (Baldwin et al., 2001). Borck and Pflüger (2006) allow for partial 
agglomeration (even if in a setting without taxes), but point out that firm counts are less 
sensitive to tax differentials if they operate in agglomerated sectors. As a result, peripheral 
locations might be more effective in attracting new firms through fiscal inducements. As 
found by Rosenthal and Strange (2004) agglomeration economies decay quickly over space 
and hence they give a greater advantage to central urban municipalities. 
The Swiss context is particularly convenient to study these phenomena, because the 
cantonal statutory corporate tax rates are neither firm nor sector specific, so there are not 
the issues that can be encountered in the UK or in Germany4. In BJS (2012) the authors 
take advantage of this setting introducing an interaction term between taxes and a sector-
specific measure of agglomeration. They find that the sensitivity of new firms’ birth to tax 
differentials is decreasing in the level of agglomeration of the sector in which they operate. 
In this chapter, we further develop the BJS (2012) paper by using more flexible 
estimation technique to study the relationship between new firms’ birth and the sector-
specific agglomeration index. The functional form imposed in their estimates actually 
forced the results to show a smooth decay of sensitivity to tax differentials, implicitly ruling 
out the possibility of “catastrophic agglomerations”, possibly the most interesting 
theoretical feature introduced by the core-periphery model. Allowing for different types of 
functional forms and in particular for structural breaks, we leave the data tell us whether 
this fascinating theoretical prediction is purely fictional or it is grounded in reality. 
1.3 Theoretical model  
The location decisions of new firms can be modelled in two different ways. On the one 
hand there is the footloose-startup approach, according to which investors choose where 
to set up a firm from a set of given locations. On the other hand there is the latent-startup 
model which states that there are a certain number of immobile potential entrepreneurs 
that decide continuously whether to start up a firm or not. While these two approaches are 
indistinguishable from an empirical analysis point of view, they are not identical from a 
theoretical model perspective. For the sake of simplicity we follow a standard footloose 
                                                          
4 In the UK (and, similarly, in Germany) new firms can negotiate the tax rate with local governments.  
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entrepreneur approach, where entrepreneurs are mobile and decide where to set up their 
firm depending on the expected real return to their investment, i.e. the real relative profits.  
We start from a basic model of New Economic Geography. There are 2 regions (North 
and South), 2 sectors (A, agriculture and M, manufacturing) and 2 production factors (H, 
entrepreneurs – who are mobile – and L, workers that are immobile). The model is 
symmetric in tastes, technology, trade costs and endowments. The utility function of a 
typical consumer is: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  U ≡ CMμ ⋅ CA1−μ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (1) 
where CM is the consumption of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite of 
industrial varieties, defined by: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝐶𝑀 ≡ �� 𝑐𝑖𝜎−1𝜎 𝑑𝑑𝑛+𝑛∗
𝑖=0
 � 𝜎𝜎−1  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (2) 
with 0 < 𝜇 < 1 < 𝜎. 𝜇 represents the expenditure share of the industrial varieties; 𝑛 is the 
mass (number) of north varieties and 𝑛∗  is the mass (number) of south varieties; 𝜎 is the 
CES between varieties. We also define ω ≡ 𝑤
𝑝
  the indirect utility function for typical 
northern entrepreneurs (which also corresponds to a typical firm’s real profits) and 
𝜔𝐿 ≡
𝑤𝐿
𝑝
 the one for northern workers, where 𝑤 and 𝑤𝐿 represent, respectively, the wage 
for entrepreneurs (the mobile factor H) and workers. The price index 𝑃 is defined as: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑃 ≡ 𝑝𝑎1−𝜇(𝛥𝑛𝑤)−𝑎  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (3) 
where, 
Δ ≡
∫ 𝑝𝑖
1−σ𝑑𝑖
𝑛𝑤
𝑖=0
nw
      and     a ≡ μ
σ−1
 
The manufacturing sector (industry) is monopolistically competitive and shows 
increasing returns to scale. The production of a typical variety of the manufactured good 
requires 1 entrepreneurs (implying a fixed cost of 𝐹𝑤, where 𝐹 = 1) and 𝑎𝑚 units of 
worker’s labor for each unit of output produced. Hence, the total cost of producing 𝑥 units 
of a variety can be written as: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑤 + 𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑚𝑥 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (4) 
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with the first addendum representing the fixed costs and the second the variable ones. The 
trade in industrial goods suffers from iceberg trade costs, hence, to sell 1 unit in the other 
country it is necessary to ship 𝜏 > 1 units, because 𝜏 − 1 unit melts in the transportation 
process. 
The agricultural good, instead, is homogeneous, subject to perfect competition, has a 
constant return to scale production process, which requires workers only. The cost of 
production of the agricultural good is 𝑤𝐿𝑎𝐴. Each region is endowed with the same 
number of workers, which are interregionally immobile, hence 𝐿 = 𝐿∗ = 𝐿𝑤/2 where 𝐿𝑤 is 
the world supply of workers. Entrepreneurs are interregionally mobile and their spatial 
allocation across regions is then endogenous. Entrepreneur’s migration decisions are based 
on real wage differences; we can write the migration equation as follows: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑠𝐻
⋅ = (𝜔 − 𝜔∗) 𝐻
𝐻𝑤
�
𝐻𝑤 − 𝐻
𝐻𝑤
� ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (5) 
where 𝐻𝑤  is the world supply of entrepreneurs. The migration equation depends on the 
real wage gap and the share of entrepreneurs in the North and in the South respectively. 
In the short run equilibrium, in the agricultural sector, marginal cost pricing is applied: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑝𝐴 = 𝑎𝐴𝑤𝐿               𝑝𝐴∗ = 𝑎𝐴𝑤𝐿 ∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (6) 
and the non-full-specialization (NFS) condition implies that the world expenditure on good 
𝐴 has to satisfy the condition: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  (1 − 𝜇)𝐸𝑤 > 12 𝐿𝑤𝑎𝐴  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (7) 
The worldwide demand for good 𝐴 can be written as: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝐶𝐴 = (1 − 𝜇) (𝐸 + 𝐸∗)𝑝𝐴 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (8) 
where 𝐸 and 𝐸∗ are the consumption expenditure in the north and the south respectively. 
Conversely, a constant share 𝜇 of expenditure is spent on industrial goods. The northern 
consumption of variety 𝑗 can be expressed as: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑐𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗−𝜎   � 𝜇𝐸𝛥𝑛𝑤�     with     𝐸 = 𝑤𝐻 + 𝑤𝐿𝐿   ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (9) 
Given monopolistic competition and the structure of the demand functions, mill-pricing 
is optimal: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑝 =   𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑀
1−1/𝜎          𝑝∗  = 𝜏𝑤𝐿𝑎𝑀1−1/𝜎  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (10) 
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and the pricing equations depend on the wages of the immobile factor, which is the same 
in both regions, because the trade of good 𝐴 is costless. 
The reward of an entrepreneur is the profit (𝛱 = ω ≡ 𝑤/𝑝) of a typical variety. Mill-
pricing and constant mark-up imply that profits are equal to the value of sales multiplied by 
the profit margin (1/𝜎). Hence, the profits for a northern and a southern entrepreneur are, 
respectively: 
*************𝑤 = 𝛱 = 𝜇
𝜎
∙ 𝐵 ∙
𝐸𝑊
𝑛𝑊
     and     𝑤∗ = 𝛱∗ = 𝜇
𝜎
∙ 𝐵∗ ∙
𝐸𝑊
𝑛𝑊
 *************(11) 
where 
**************𝐵 ≡ �𝑠𝐸
∆
� + 𝜑 �1−𝑠𝐸
∆∗
�     and     𝐵∗ ≡ �𝜑𝑠𝐸
∆
�  + �1−𝑠𝐸
∆∗
�**************(12) 
with 
***************∆≡ 𝑠𝑛 + 𝜑(1 − 𝑠𝑛)     and     ∆∗≡ 𝜑𝑠𝑛 + (1 − 𝑠𝑛) ***************(13) 
and, finally, 𝑠𝐸 = 𝐸/𝐸𝑊 and 𝑠𝑛 = 𝑛/𝑛𝑊. 
The spatial allocation of expenditure depends on the spatial distribution of industry and 
on the parameters of the model. We can express the world expenditure as: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝐸𝑤 = 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑤 + 𝜇𝜎 𝐸𝑤  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (14) 
which – defining 𝑏 ≡ 𝜇/𝜎 – can be rewritten as 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝐸𝑤 = 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑤1 − 𝑏  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (15) 
The full employment of entrepreneurs implies that 𝑛𝑤 = 𝐻𝑤, hence the share of 
expenditure can be expressed as: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑠𝐸 = (1 − 𝑏)𝑠𝐿 + 𝑏𝐵𝑠𝐻  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (16) 
where 𝑠𝐿 is the northern share of workers and 𝑠𝐻 is the northern share of entrepreneurs. 
Given that we are in the symmetric case, 𝑠𝐿 = 1/2, hence, the relative market size depends 
on the location decision of the mobile factor 𝑠𝐻 and on its profitability 𝐵. This also implies 
that production shifting (changes in 𝑠𝐻) will lead to expenditure shifting (changes in 𝑠𝐸). 
Finally, the typical industrial firm’s cost function is non-homothetic, hence the 
equilibrium firm size (𝑥) depends on relative factor prices: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑥 = 𝛱𝜎
𝑝
 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (17) 
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We now normalize the variables of the model in order to simplify and make it more 
tractable. We choose sector 𝐴 as numeraire and take units such that 𝑎𝐴 = 1 so that 
𝑤𝐿 = 𝑤𝐿∗ = 1. We set 𝑎𝑚 = 1 − (1/𝜎) so that the northern and the southern price of a 
typical northern variety are 𝑝 = 1 and 𝑝∗ = 𝜏. As a result, our normalizations boil down 
to: 
𝑝𝐴  =  𝑝𝐴∗ = 𝑤𝐿 = 𝑤𝐿∗ = 1,     𝜑 = 𝜏1−𝜎,     𝑛𝑤 ≡ 𝑛 + 𝑛∗ = 1,     𝐻𝑤 ≡ 𝐻 + 𝐻∗ = 1, 
𝑛  =  𝐻 = 𝑠𝑛 = 𝑠𝐻,        𝑛∗ = 𝐻∗ = 𝑠𝑛∗ = 1 − 𝑠𝑛,        𝐿𝑤 = 1 − 𝑏,     𝐸𝑤 = 1 
The long-run equilibrium has the same properties of the short-run one, but all migration 
stops. This can happen at an interior solution – i.e. for 0 < 𝑠𝑛 < 1 – when migration stops 
because entrepreneurs achieve the same level of utility in both regions (𝜔 = 𝜔∗) or at a 
core-periphery (CP henceforth) outcome – i.e. for 𝑠𝑛 = 0 or 𝑠𝑛 = 1. 
When trade freeness rises beyond the break point (𝜑𝐵), the interior solution becomes 
unstable, while the CP outcomes become stable and a slight shock to an interior solution 
generates self-reinforcing forces, resulting in catastrophic agglomeration. Agglomeration 
rents are a concave function of trade freeness: as trade gets freer – i.e. 𝜑 rises from 𝜑𝑆 
towards 1 – agglomeration forces first rise and then fall. 
The standard tax competition literature relies on smooth models in which small changes 
lead to small effects. The economic geography models, on the contrary, are “lumpy” by 
their very nature, because of agglomeration forces, as shown by Kind et al (2000), and 
Ludema and Wooton (2000). Spatial concentration of economic activities creates forces 
that favor further concentration. This can be illustrated with a standard “wiggle diagram” 
(Figure 1.1). 
The vertical axis shows the real return ratio (of the North over the South) of the mobile 
factor. The horizontal axis shows the North’s share of the mobile factor, denoted as 𝑠𝑛 
which is a measure of agglomeration. When the reward is higher in the North, the 
entrepreneurs will move to the North, and vice-versa if it is higher in the South. In a 
standard neoclassical model the situation would be the one described by the thick solid 
line: the real reward of locating in the north is always downward sloping and it is unity for 
𝑠𝑛 = 1/2. If we start at this point, raising the taxes in the north, generating a tax gap, 
would push some firms to the south, until we get to point A, where the real reward 
between the two regions are equalized again. The same behavior can be observed when 
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agglomeration forces are present, but trade is quite restricted. The situation is depicted by 
the thin solid line: in this case the same tax gap would generate smaller migration towards 
the south. 
 
 
However, when trade gets free enough, the relationship between the reward ratio and 
the dispersion of firms is reversed. The dashed line shows that the slope is positive at 
𝑠𝑛 = 1/2, which means that at this level of openness, agglomeration forces are so strong 
that the benefit of agglomerating in one region tends to increase as the extent of the 
agglomeration increases. Moreover, the real reward is higher in the north when all firms 
locate in the North (CPN) and is higher in the south when all firms locate to the South 
(CPS). Hence, asymmetric taxation can have no effect on location: if the real reward is 
above the tax gap, the firm is still better off staying in the high tax region.  
Translating this into our setting, we can interpret the sensitivity of new firm births to tax 
gaps as tax-base responsiveness to taxation at different level of sectoral agglomeration. 
Firms locate where the real return ratio is higher after having taken into account taxes. 
Analytically, our previous normalizations imply that: 
𝛥 = 1,       𝛥∗ = 𝜏1−𝜎        ⇒        𝑃 ≡ 1,       𝑃∗ ≡ 𝜑−𝑎 
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We can now rewrite the profit functions for the North and the South as: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝛱 = 𝑏 � 𝑠𝐸
𝜑 + 𝑛(1 − 𝜑) + 𝜑(1 − 𝑠𝐸)1 − 𝑛(1 − 𝜑)� ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (18) 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝛱∗ = 𝑏 � 𝜑𝑠𝐸
𝜑 + 𝑛(1 −𝜑) + 1 − 𝑠𝐸1 − 𝑛(1 − 𝜑)�  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (19) 
Using these two profit equations and the North and South price levels, we can write the 
equation for 𝛺, which defines the ratio of the real returns for an entrepreneur, net of taxes: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝛺 = 𝛱𝑃𝛱∗
𝑃∗
= (1 − 𝑏𝑏)𝜑−𝑎1 + 𝑏𝑏 − 4𝑏𝑛𝑏  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (20) 
where 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑏 = 1 − 𝜑1 + 𝜑  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (21) 
If we now account for taxes, where 𝑡 is the tax rate in the North and 𝑡∗ the tax rate in 
the South, the relative taxation is defined by 𝑇 = (1 − 𝑡)/(1 − 𝑡∗). The equilibrium 
condition for the entrepreneur then becomes 𝑇 ⋅ 𝛺 = 1, i.e. the return for the entrepreneur 
is the same once accounting for relative taxes. Rearranging the equilibrium condition, we 
get that T = 1/Ω, from which – taking the derivative with respect to 𝑛 and rearranging 
once again – we obtain:  
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑇
= − 𝛺2
𝑑𝛺
𝑑𝑛
= (1 − 𝑏𝑏)𝜑−𝑎4𝑏𝑏  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (22) 
From the previous equation it is possible to derive a threshold value for 𝑏, which we 
call 𝑏𝑐 , because it defines the boundary region within which a small tax change might lead 
to a catastrophic location effect. Given that 𝑏 is a measure of closedness, when 𝑏 > 𝑏𝑐 
trade is closed enough and we do not get the 𝐶𝑃 outcome. When trade becomes freer, i.e. 
𝑏 < 𝑏𝑐 , a small change in 𝑇 can trigger a 𝐶𝑃 outcome. The critical value 𝑏𝑐 can be written 
as: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑏𝑐 = 𝜓 − �𝜓2 − 4(𝑎 + 𝑏)22(𝑎 + 𝑏) ,             𝜓 ≡ 1 + 𝑏(𝑏 + 2𝑎) > 0 ∗∗∗∗∗ (23) 
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Both 𝑑𝑛/𝑑𝑇 and 𝑏𝑐 are functions of 𝑏, 𝑏, 𝑎 and 𝜑, a fact that allows us to rewrite their 
expression as a function of the three basic parameters 𝜇, 𝜎 and 𝜏. Finally, it is important to 
highlight that in our empirical analysis we will compute the effect of agglomeration 
economies on the sensitivity of new firms birth with respect to the tax rate of a 
municipality, that is with respect to 𝑡 and not to 𝑇. However, using the chain rule, we can 
rewrite 𝑑𝑛/𝑑𝑇 as: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑇
= 𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑇
⋅
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝑡
= − 11 − 𝑡∗ ⋅ 𝜕𝑛𝜕𝑇  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (24) 
Calibrating the parameters 𝜇, 𝜎 and 𝜏 for real world consistent values and choosing 𝑡∗ 
equal to the average corporate income tax rate on a median firm5, we can plot 𝑑𝑛/𝑑𝑡 and 
get the graph shown in Figure 1.2. The sensitivity to 𝜑-ness, i.e. openness (𝜑 is inversely 
related to 𝑏𝑐) indicates the critical level 𝑏𝑐(𝜑), below which we have a 𝐶𝑃 outcome and 
new firms birth become insensitive to changes in 𝑡, i.e. 𝑑𝑛/𝑑𝑇 = 0. 
 
 
 
In section 1.5 we will show the empirical counterpart of Figure 1.2 and in section 1.6 we 
will compare them. 
                                                          
5 Specifically, we set 𝜇 = 0.86, which was the share of expenditure on non-agricultural goods of the Swiss 
families in the period 1998-2001 (source: UST, National accounts); moreover, 𝜎 has been set equal to 4 and 
𝜏 ∈ [1.05, 1.95] ⇒ 𝜑 ∈ [0.14, 0.86]; finally, 𝑡∗ = 10.72% which is the average corporate income tax on a 
median firm. 
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1.4 Data and empirical setting 
1.4.1 Data 
We use the same dataset as BJS6.  It covers the 213 largest Swiss municipalities and 132 
industrial sectors7 for a total of 28,116 observations. Basic descriptive statistics are 
summarized in Table 1.1. 
Our dependent variable consists of the count of new firms' birth in each municipality 
and sector, pooled over the period 1999-2002. New firms are all market-oriented business 
entities that have been founded in the year concerned and are operating for at least 20 
hours per week. Data stems from the project "Unternehmensdemografie" (UDEMO) of 
the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, which also provides information about the firm's main 
sector of activity by three-digit sector of the European NACE classification. 
Our three main regressors are: the (municipal) corporate tax rate, an index of sector 
agglomeration and the stock of existing firms in each municipality. The reference year for 
all control variables is 19988.  
The municipal corporate tax rate is defined as the municipal-plus-cantonal average 
corporate income tax rate for a firm with median profitability. Cantonal tax laws define the 
basic corporate income tax schedule, which, among others, determines the degree of 
progressivity. In most cases, municipalities annually select a tax multiplier, i.e. a shifter to 
the basic tax schedule. There is an important corporate tax rate variation across and within 
Swiss Cantons. Overall, in our sample, the corporate tax rate for a firm with median return 
on capital varies between 5% and 16% (Table 1.1). Finally, it is important to note that the 
Swiss fiscal system does, in general, not allow for firm or sector-specific tax regimes9.  
As the sectoral agglomeration index we chose the Ellison-Glaeser (EG) index for spatial 
concentration (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997), which controls for differences in firms numbers 
across sectors in quantifying the extent of geographical clustering, above industrial 
structure.   
                                                          
6 See BJS for more details on the dataset. 
7 The sectors for which no firm births are observed were dropped from the dataset. Moreover, we retained 
only Activities pertaining to the private sector. This left us with 132 three-digit sectors. 
8 See Table 1.1 for additional details. 
9 One exception to this rule is that cantons may offer tax deals with new firms for up to 10 years. Data on 
these deals are unavailable. Using the count of new firms alleviates tax-rate measurement errors, as the 
number of such deals is likely small compared to total firm births. 
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Lastly, the stock of pre-existing firms consists of the number of active firms in each sector 
and municipality. The data source for the stock of firms and the calculated EG-index is the 
multi-annual firm census in Switzerland10.  
We also account for other municipal controls in the specifications where we do not 
include municipality fixed effects, to control for other socio-economic aspects that might 
affect firms' location decisions. These vary either by municipality or by both municipality 
and sector. The controls varying by municipality are: property price, (personal) income tax 
rate, public expenditure, market potential, distance to highway, a dummy for assisted 
municipalities and municipal population. Further, we control for wages, which vary by 
aggregate sectors and regions. 
Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of the Ellison-Glaeser index in our sample. It can 
easily be seen that the distribution is quite skewed to the right. We applied two 
standardizations: we de-meaned it (EGS index) and we computed the cumulative version 
of it (PEG index). 
 
 
 
The EGS index allows us to replicate the estimates of the BJS paper which interprets 
the estimated coefficient on the tax variable as the effect of taxes for a sector with average 
spatial concentration. The ordinal cumulative (PEG) index gives the same weight to a 
                                                          
10 Project "Betriebszählung" (BZ) by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
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Figure 1.3 - Kernel density estimate of the Ellison & Glaeser index
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change from one value of the agglomeration index to the following one, to take account of 
the skewness in the original EG index. The resulting distribution of the cumulative index is 
indeed uniform. 
1.4.2 Empirical setting  
The starting point of our exercise is the regression specification in the BJS paper using 
sectoral fixed effects 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑠 = 𝛼𝑠  + 𝛽0𝑇𝑖   + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝐴𝐼𝑠) + 𝛾𝑆𝑖𝑠 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑏𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠 ∗∗∗∗∗∗ (25) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑠 is the count of new firms' birth, which depends on the tax rate (𝑇𝑖), the 
agglomeration index (𝐴𝐼𝑠) and the stock of existing firms (𝑆𝑖𝑠). The distinctive feature of 
the BJS paper is the interaction term between the agglomeration index at the sector level 
and the municipal tax rate. Finally, the regression controls for sector fixed effects (𝛼𝑠) 
municipal controls (𝑋𝑖) and a set of interactions between municipal controls and the 
agglomeration index. Note that the main effect of 𝐴𝐼𝑠 is absorbed by the fixed effects11. 
The marginal effect of taxes, in the OLS case, for (25) is: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑠
𝜕𝑇𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐼𝑠 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (26) 
We did not focus on municipal fixed effects for a technical reason: they would have 
washed the direct tax effect out, because taxes are municipality specific, hence they would 
have become part of the fixed effects. Interpreting the overall effect of taxes without the 
direct effect would be tricky. Instead, we decided to include in our main analyses a set of 
municipal controls, which - we reckon - enables us to take into account socio-economic 
specificities of each municipality. The estimates including municipal fixed effects are not 
significantly different from the ones using our set of municipal controls (as it will be 
discussed in section 1.5.3); hence, for the most advanced specification (i.e. the estimates 
over two setions and the Quandt test) we will not use the municipal fixed effects, but only 
sector fixed effects and the set of municipal controls. 
                                                          
11 Alternatively, BJS estimate the above equation also including municipal fixed effects (𝛼𝑖). This implies 
that here the main effect of taxes is absorbed by the municipal fixed effects. 
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Dealing with count data, the appropriate way to estimate the effect of taxes on new 
firms’ birth is through a Poisson regression model. The model that we are going to estimate 
can be synthetically expressed by the following equation: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑦𝑖𝑠 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝐹(𝑊)] ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (27) 
where 𝐹(𝑊) describes the particular model specification we are considering. Similar to 
BJS, we use Poisson fixed effects estimators for all our specifications and present marginal 
effects for the coefficients of interest. 
    We propose four alternative empirical strategies to allow for potential non-linearities 
or discontinuities in the above setting: (i) polynomial estimation; (ii) splines; (iii) estimation 
over percentiles; (iv) estimation over two sections of variable length, allowing the main 
effect and/or the interaction term to differ over the two sections of the agglomeration 
index distribution. As a complement to strategy (iv) we perform a Quandt test for 
structural break in order to figure out whether and where - along the 𝐴𝐼 distribution - there 
might be a structural break in the effect of taxes. 
Following the NEG literature we allow for potential non-linarities only along the 
agglomeration index, assuming that non-linear effects in the firms' location choices can be 
driven only by the concentration of the sector. 
To fit strategy (i), we performed polynomial estimates12 of the interaction between the 
tax rate and the agglomeration index raised at the second (𝑝 = 2), third (𝑝 = 3) and fourth 
(𝑝 = 4) power; hence, we have that: 
∗∗∗∗∗ 𝐹(𝑊)  =  𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑖 + �{𝛽𝜏[𝑇𝑖(𝐴𝐼𝑠)𝜏]}𝑝
𝜏=1
+ 𝛾�𝑦𝑖𝑠,−1� + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑏𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠 ∗ (28) 
The estimated overall effect of taxes is: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑠
𝜕𝑇𝑖
= �𝛽0 + �{𝛽𝜏(𝐴𝐼𝑠)𝜏}𝑝
𝜏=1
� 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝐹(𝑊)]  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (29) 
To pursue strategy (ii) we estimated a spline over quintiles (𝑝 = 5) and deciles (𝑝 = 10) 
of the agglomeration indexes, fitting a Poisson regression where: 
                                                          
12 The polynomial terms have been orthogonalized in all specifications. 
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𝐹(𝑊)   =  𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽₀𝑇𝑖  + 𝛽₁ ���𝑑𝑞𝑝
𝑞=1
�𝐴𝐼𝑠 ⋅ 𝑇𝑖� +  
  ∗∗∗∗∗ + � �𝛽𝜏 ���𝑑𝑞𝑝
𝑞=𝜏
� (𝐴𝐼𝑠 − 𝑐𝜏−1)𝑇𝑖��𝑝{𝜏=2} + 𝛾�𝑦𝑖𝑠,−1� + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑏𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠 ∗ (30) 
where 𝑑𝑞 are dummies for the respective percentiles of the agglomeration index, the 𝛽𝜏 
coefficients refer to the interaction terms between the tax rate and each single percentile of 
the agglomeration index and 𝑐𝜏 is the cut-off value of the agglomeration index between 
one percentile and another. It should be noted that 𝛽₁ is the coefficient for the basic 
interaction term across percentiles, while the 𝛽𝜏 coefficients are incremental coefficients on 
top of 𝛽₁.  
The estimated overall effect of taxes is: 
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝑇𝑖
 =  (𝛽0 + 𝛽1��∑ 𝑑𝑞𝑝𝑞=1 �𝐴𝐼𝑠�+ 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  +��𝛽𝜏 ���𝑑𝑞𝑝
𝑞=𝜏
� (𝐴𝐼𝑠 − 𝑐𝜏−1)��𝑝
𝜏=2
)exp[𝐹(𝑊)]  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (31) 
To implement strategy (iii) we fitted a Poisson regression over quintiles (𝑝 = 5) and 
deciles (𝑝 = 10) with: 
∗∗∗∗∗ 𝐹(𝑊)  =  𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑖 + ���𝛽𝜏𝜏�𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝐴𝐼𝑠𝜏 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏��𝑝
𝜏=1
𝑞
𝜏=1
+ 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  +𝛾�𝑦𝑖𝑠,−1� + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑏𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (32) 
were the 𝛽𝜏𝜏 coefficients refer to the interaction terms between the tax rate and each single 
percentile of the agglomeration index; 𝑑𝜏 is a set of dummy variables – one for each 
percentile. 
The estimated overall effect of taxes is: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑠
𝜕𝑇𝑖
= �𝛽0 + ���𝛽𝜏𝜏�𝐴𝐼𝑠𝜏 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏��𝑝
𝜏=1
𝑞
𝜏=1
�  𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝐹(𝑊)] ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (33) 
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Finally, to operationalize the Quandt test (Quandt, 1960), strategy (iv), we choose two 
sections of variable length with piecewise linear interactions. Strategy (iv) is borrowed from 
time series analysis, where it is most frequently used. It involves a repeated Chow test for 
structural breaks over each possible value of the threshold. The Chow test compares the 
goodness of fit of the estimates done with the full model to the restricted model. The 
Quandt statistic is the maximum value among these repeated Chow tests. Critical values for 
this test have been computed by Andrews (1993 and 2003) and are larger than the ones for 
a standard Chow test, since - being a repeated test - it has more chances to reject the null 
hypothesis of no structural break on the coefficient values. More specifically, we looked for 
break points over the central 70% of the values of the agglomeration indexes, leading to 70 
possible break points, ranging from 16% to 85%.  
In our analyses, the restricted model is defined by a Poisson regression with 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝐹(𝑊) = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝐴𝐼𝑠) + 𝛾�𝑦𝑖𝑠,−1� + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑏𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠 ∗∗∗∗ (34) 
where the marginal effect of taxes is: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑠
𝜕𝑇𝑖
= (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐼𝑠)𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝐹(𝑊)] ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (35) 
We considered three alternative specification of the full model, respectively with (a) two 
different main effects and two different interaction terms, (b) two different main effects 
and one interaction term, (c) two different main effects and no interaction term. 
For specification (a) we have that: 
𝐹(𝑊)  =  𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽01(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏1) + 𝛽02(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏2) + 𝛽11(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝐴𝐼𝑠 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏1) + 
************+ 𝛽12(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝐴𝐼𝑠 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏2) + 𝛾�𝑦𝑖𝑠,−1� + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑏𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (36) 
where 𝜏₁ ranges from 𝜏₁ = 16 to 𝜏₁ = 85 and 𝜏₂ = 1 − 𝜏₁and the marginal effect of taxes 
is: 
∗∗∗∗
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑠
𝜕𝑇𝑖
= {𝛽01𝑑𝜏1 + 𝛽02𝑑𝜏2 + 𝛽11(𝐴𝐼𝑠 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏1) + 𝛽12(𝐴𝐼𝑠 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏2)}𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝐹(𝑊)] ∗ (37) 
For specification (𝑏) we have that: 
𝐹(𝑊) = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽01(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏1) + 𝛽02(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏₂) + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝐴𝐼𝑠) + 𝛾�𝑦𝑖𝑠,−1� + 
∗∗∗∗∗∗ + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑏𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (38) 
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and the marginal effect is: 
 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑠
𝜕𝑇𝑖
= {𝛽01𝑑𝜏1 + 𝛽02𝑑𝜏2 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝐴𝐼𝑠)}𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝐹(𝑊)] ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (39) 
Lastly for specification (𝑐) we have that 
∗∗∗∗ 𝐹(𝑊) = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽01(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏1) + 𝛽02(𝑇𝑖 ⋅ 𝑑𝜏2) + 𝛾�𝑦𝑖𝑠,−1� + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜂𝑏𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠  (40) 
and the marginal effect is: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑠
𝜕𝑇𝑖
= {𝛽01𝑑𝜏1 + 𝛽02𝑑𝜏2}𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝐹(𝑊)] ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (41) 
1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Polynomial and spline regressions with sector fixed effects 
We start by re-estimating the linear specification as in BJS13, using municipal control 
variables and sector fixed-effects. The only difference to the BJS's estimates is that we use 
the cumulative ordinal EG-index (PEG). Results are presented in column 1 of Table 1.2 
and Figure 1.4. Addressing the skewness of the original EG-index implies that, in the linear 
specification, the interaction term of taxes and agglomeration is, while still positive, not 
significant anymore. Note that the main effect of taxes is, as expected, negative and 
significant. However, Figure 1.4 shows that there is still an important range of degrees of 
agglomeration where taxes have a significantly negative impact on firm location. 
In the reminder of Table 1.2 we present specifications using polynomial and spline 
regressions, thus allowing for non-linearities, but not jumps. Column 2 uses a second order 
polynomial specification, while column 3 a fourth order one. In both specifications the 
main effect is negative and highly significant, again implying that, with no spatial sectoral 
agglomeration, taxes exert strong deterrence to firm location. Similarly, both in column 2 
and 3 of Table 1.2, the first two orders (linear and squared term) of the polynomial are 
positive and significant, while in column 3 the third and fourth order polynomial are not 
                                                          
13 Cf. Table 1.2 and Figure 1.6 of BJS. 
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significant. However, as illustrated by the F-test on joint significance, all polynomial terms 
are jointly significant. 
 
 
Table 1.2 - Poisson base, polynomial and spline regressions with interactions 
 
Dep. var. = new firms per municipality and sector 
VARIABLES Base, PEG 
2nd Poly, 
PEG 
4th Poly, 
PEG VARIABLES 
Spline 5, 
PEG 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) 
            
Tax -0.0583** -0.0199** -0.0229** Tax -0.00555 
 
(0.0232) (0.00953) (0.00995)   (0.0393) 
Tax × PEG Index 0.0488 0.0340*** 0.0349*** Tax × k₁(PEG Index) -0.254 
 
(0.0481) (0.00959) (0.00954)   (0.241) 
Tax × (PEG Index)² 
 
0.0364*** 0.0382*** Tax × k₂(PEG Index) 0.337 
  
(0.00956) (0.00829)   (0.375) 
Tax × (PEG Index)³ 
  
0.0125 Tax × k₃(PEG Index) -0.273 
   
(0.00903)   (0.326) 
Tax × (PEG Index)⁴ 
  
0.00215 Tax × k₄(PEG Index) 0.574* 
   
(0.00754)   (0.345) 
    
Tax × k₅(PEG Index) 0.360 
    
  (0.445) 
Wage -0.505*** -0.484*** -0.479***   -0.479*** 
 
(0.0927) (0.0813) (0.0805)   (0.0832) 
Stock of firms 0.000108** 0.000114** 0.000118** Stock of firms 0.000116** 
 
(5.45e-05) (5.45e-05) (5.62e-05)   (5.78e-05) 
Wage × Aggl. Index 0.0686 -0.0190 -0.0408   -0.0394 
 
(0.181) (0.183) (0.193)   (0.195) 
Property price × A.I. 1.192** 1.315** 1.333**   1.331** 
 
(0.487) (0.545) (0.548)   (0.550) 
    
  
 Municipal controls YES YES YES Municipal controls YES 
    
  
 Sector FE YES YES YES Sector FE YES 
    
  
 Observations 28,116 28,116 28,116 Observations 28,116 
Number of sectors 132 132 132 Number of sectors 132 
F-test on Tax × 
(PEG)ⁱ 
 
19.97 29.17 
F-test on Tax × 
kᵢ(PEG) 29.38 
Prob > Chi2 
 
0.000 0.000 Prob > F 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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The higher order positive coefficients imply that the deterrence effect of taxes is 
reduced, at an increasing rate, with a higher level of agglomeration. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1.5, using the specification with the 4th order polynomial14.  
 
 
 
We can observe that the effect of taxes on firm location is essentially flat and 
(significantly) negative up to around the 60th-percentile of the distribution. Shortly after 
the median of the distribution (point 0.5 of the PEG) there is an inflection point in the 
                                                          
14 We estimated 2nd, 3rd and 4th degree polynomial specification. The qualitative results is the same for the 
three specification; we show the result for the 4th degree because it is the most visually clear one. 
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Figure 1.5 - Poisson polynomial estimation (4th degree)
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slope of the tax effect. This implies that, for the fifth quintile of the distribution of 
agglomeration, taxes essentially do not play a role for firm location. Indeed, for the most 
agglomerated sector, taxes have a positive effect on firm location. 
Finally, in column 4 of Table 1.2 we present spline regressions, including five splines 
over each quintile of the PEG-distribution15.  Note that, individually, only the spline term 
over the fourth quintile is significant and positive. However, jointly all the terms are highly 
significant (see F-test at the bottom of the column). The spline regression implies a 
relatively flat and negative effect of taxes, with an inflection point in the relationship for the 
fourth quintile and an essentially zero effect of taxes for the most agglomerated sectors. 
1.5.2 Percentile regressions with sector fixed effects 
We next allow for structural breaks in the relationship between taxes and sectoral 
agglomeration, using quintile and decile regressions. The results are presented in Table 1.3. 
Column 1 shows the regression using quintiles over the agglomeration index (PEG). We 
can observe that, as before, the main effect of taxes is negative and significant. 
Interestingly, the only interaction term individually significant (and positive) is the one for 
the fifth quintile. Results are similar when estimating the interaction terms over deciles, in 
which case only the ninth and tenth percentile terms are significant.16 
Figure 1.6 illustrates these results for the quintile regression. Note that the tax effect is 
essentially flat and negative over the first four quintiles of the PEG-distribution. One can 
detect a slight inflection in the tax effect for the fourth quintile, but the jump is not 
significant. However, the tax effect is starkly different for the most agglomerated sectors, 
where it actually turns positive. 
  
                                                          
15 The results using ten spline terms are qualitatively similar and available upon request. 
16 However, the main effect is, albeit negative, not significant anymore. 
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Table 1.3 - Poisson percentile regressions with interactions 
Dep. var. = new firms per municipality and sector 
VARIABLES Quintiles of PEG    VARIABLES 
Deciles of 
PEG 
 
(1) 
 
  
 
(2) 
           
Tax rate -0.0474* 
 
  Tax rate -0.0695 
 
(0.0288) 
 
  
 
(0.0540) 
Tax × Aggl. Index × q₁(PEG) 0.0850 
 
  Tax × Aggl. Index × d₁(PEG) 0.653 
 
(0.117) 
 
  
 
(0.647) 
Tax × Aggl. Index × q₂(PEG) -0.0145 
 
  Tax × Aggl. Index × d₂(PEG) 0.207 
 
(0.101) 
 
  
 
(0.239) 
Tax × Aggl. Index × q₃(PEG) -0.0381 
 
  Tax × Aggl. Index × d₃(PEG) 0.0740 
 
(0.0512) 
 
  
 
(0.214) 
Tax × Aggl. Index × q₄(PEG) 0.0307 
 
  Tax × Aggl. Index × d₄(PEG) 0.0679 
 
(0.0483) 
 
  
 
(0.166) 
Tax × Aggl. Index × q₅(PEG) 0.154*** 
 
  Tax × Aggl. Index × d₅(PEG) 0.0605 
 
(0.0444) 
 
  
 
(0.112) 
   
  Tax × Aggl. Index × d₆(PEG) -0.00373 
   
  
 
(0.0950) 
   
  Tax × Aggl. Index × d₇(PEG) 0.0380 
   
  
 
(0.0849) 
   
  Tax × Aggl. Index × d₈(PEG) 0.0725 
   
  
 
(0.0786) 
   
  Tax × Aggl. Index × d₉(PEG) 0.146** 
   
  
 
(0.0614) 
   
  Tax × Aggl. Index × d₁₀(PEG) 0.191*** 
   
  
 
(0.0654) 
Wage -0.486*** 
 
  Wage -0.477*** 
 
(0.0830) 
 
  
 
(0.0845) 
Stock of firms 0.000120** 
 
  Stock of firms 0.000125** 
 
(5.65e-05) 
 
  
 
(5.83e-05) 
Wage × Aggl. Index -0.0198 
 
  Wage × Aggl. Index -0.0430 
 
(0.195) 
 
  
 
(0.195) 
Property price × A.I. 1.313** 
 
  Property price × A.I. 1.323** 
 
(0.544) 
 
  
 
(0.545) 
 
  
 
Municipal controls YES 
 
  Municipal controls YES 
  
  
  
Sector FE YES 
 
  Sector FE YES 
   
  
  
Observations 28,116 
 
  Observations 28,116 
Number of sector 132     Number of sectors 132 
F-test on Tax × PEG × qᵢ(PEG) 23.22    F-test on Tax × PEG × dᵢ(PEG) 67.61 
Prob > Chi2 0.000     Prob > Chi2 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.5.3 Regressions with sector and municipal fixed effects 
When estimating equations (28), (30) e (32) including sector and municipal fixed effects 
we do not obtain the main effect of taxes anymore. Table 1.4 presents these results 
applying the same specifications as before, i.e. polynomial, spline and percentiles, while 
Figure 1.7 illustrates them. 
The results are consistent with the ones presented above. In column (2) and (3) we 
present 2nd and 4th order polynomials. Note that the linear and squared terms are highly 
positive and significant in both specifications. In the 4th order polynomial, all terms are 
jointly significant (see F-test at bottom of the column). 
Similarly, the five-step spline results in only the fourth spline term to be positive and 
significant, again as in the specification without municipal fixed effects. Finally, using 
quintiles of the agglomeration index, we obtain anew that the interaction for the fourth and 
fifth quintiles are positive and statistically significant. 
Overall, these results confirm our findings from above. A relatively flat effect of taxes 
for a large range of sectoral agglomeration, with a strong and positive interaction term for 
the most agglomerated sectors. 
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Figure 1.6 - Poisson quintile regression
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1.6 Discussion of results 
What do our results imply? One possible interpretation of our results above is that taxes 
have a deterrent effect on firm location for a large range of sectoral agglomeration (up to 
the fourth quintile), but that taxes play a much reduced or essentially no role for firm 
location in the most agglomerated sectors. Hence, taking the above results seriously implies 
that there seem to be two types of sectors, depending on the degree of agglomeration 
forces present. For the majority of sectors, taxes have a negative influence on firm location, 
while for the most concentrated ones, agglomeration forces may outweigh taxation 
concerns. This follows quite nicely the classification of sectors in NEG-models, sectors 
with constant returns to scale that “behave” according to the standard neo-classical theory 
of tax competition, and increasing returns to scale sectors, where taxes play a minor role. 
This also implies that there might be a threshold of the degree of agglomeration where the 
tax effect starkly changes. This result has guided our research strategy in what follows. 
We performed a Quandt test over specifications (𝑎), (𝑏), and (𝑐) (i.e. eq. 36, 38 and 
40). The test – whose results are shown in Figure 1.8 – exhibit a peak at the 82nd percentile 
of the PEG index. The implied marginal effects for specification (𝑎) and (𝑏) are shown in 
Figure 1.9, respectively.  
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Figure 1.7 - Spline and quintile regressions with municipality fixed effects
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The discontinuity at the 82nd percentile is clear in both cases. However, the sharpest 
results emerges with respect to specification (𝑐), whose results at the 82nd percentile are 
shown in Table 1.5, both for the EG and the PEG index. Both segments are strongly 
significant: we find a negative effect of taxes on firm location for less agglomerated sectors; 
instead, the coefficient becomes positive (and significant) for the most agglomerated 
sectors. The significance of the discontinuity is highlighted by the non-intersection of the 
confidence intervals for the two segments as shown in Figure 1.10. 
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Figure 1.8 - Repeated Chow Tests
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Figure 1.9 - Structural break
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Table 1.5 - Poisson estimation over two sections 
                                                           Dep. var. = new firms per municipality and sector 
                                                            Full sample - Break point at the 82nd percentile 
     VARIABLES AI = EG AI = PEG (1) (2) 
      
     Tax × s₁(AI) -0.0493*** -0.0488*** 
  (0.0138) (0.0136) 
     Tax × s₂(AI) 0.0914*** 0.0993*** 
  (0.0346) (0.0341) 
     Wage -0.518*** -0.483*** 
  (0.0853) (0.0772) 
     Stock of firms 0.000130** 0.000116** 
  (5.90e-05) (5.40e-05) 
     Wage × Aggl. Index 2.447 -0.0309 
 (1.553) (0.197)      Property price × Aggl. Index 17.29** 1.351** 
  (7.037) (0.575) 
      
     Municipal controls YES YES 
      
     Sector FE YES YES 
      
     Observations 28,116 28,116 
     Number of sector 132 132 
     Chi2 on Tax × sᵢ(AI) 18.89 20.32 
     Prob > Chi2 0.0001 0.0000 
s.e. in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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It is now interesting to compare Figures 1.9 and 1.10 with Figure 1.2, which represents 
their theoretical counterpart: qualitatively speaking the result are very comparable, even if 
the structural break – the threshold 𝑏𝑐(𝜑) in our theoretical model – occurs around the 
median of the openness parameter. However, it is important to bear in mind that the 
distribution of the EG index is very skewed and hence we standardized it introducing the 
PEG, which assumes as its maximum the highest level of observed EG. This implies that 
the actual level of EG – despite being at the 82nd percentile of its cumulative distribution – 
is smaller when reported on a [0, 1] scale. 
Finally, it is informative comparing the sectors right below the 82nd percentile threshold 
with the sectors right above. These sectors are listed in Tables 1.6 and 1.7 respectively. 
After computing the average of the effective corporate tax rates that they are subject to, we 
tested the null hypothesis that the difference between these averages is equal to zero. We 
are able to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. This simple test 
provides further evidence of the discontinuity at work. 
These results seem to be a reasonably convincing evidence of the behavior predicted by 
the core-periphery outcome: once a sector reaches a critical threshold it becomes – all of a 
sudden – insensitive to tax differential. 
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1.7 Conclusions 
Catastrophic agglomeration is a fascinating prediction of the NEG literature. Despite 
having been described as “perhaps the most celebrated feature of the core-periphery 
model”17, it has always been mainly considered a theoretical curiosity so far. Head and 
Mayer (2004, p. 2662), have been very tough with it, arguing that “(c)atastrophes (...) 
should perhaps be considered more as fascinating theoretical 'exotica' rather than as robust 
elements of economic geography”. Along the same line, Combes et al. (2008, p. 337) stated 
that the “studies undertaken to date seem to converge in invalidating the existence of 
phenomena such as catastrophes”. 
First, we generalize the result of the footloose capital model, deriving the general 
formula describing the sensitivity of the tax base to taxes at different levels of 
agglomeration economies.  
Second, we use more flexible estimation techniques, to assess the sensitivity of new 
firms’ birth to tax differentials depending on the level of observed sectoral agglomeration. 
Our analyses suggest that there are non-linearities in the response of new firms’ birth to tax 
differential at different levels of the agglomeration of the sector considered. This evidence 
is robust to polynomial, spline and percentile specifications.  
Third, to further validate these results, we performed a Quandt test for structural break, 
a technique more often used in time-series analyses. Consistently with our expectations 
from previous analyses, we find a structural break at the 82nd percentile of our cumulative 
measure of sector agglomeration. This result is also robust to the three types of 
specifications that we tested. 
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to empirically detect evidence of catastrophic 
agglomeration and our results hint that such discontinuous agglomeration forces may not 
be completely unrealistic. 
  
                                                          
17 Baldwin et al. (2003, p. 35) 
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Stop invasion! Immigrants and the 
rise of populism in Europe 1 
 
 
with Massimo Bordignon, Catholic University of Milan and CIFREL 
 Gilberto Turati, Catholic University of Rome and CIFREL 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a vast debate all over Europe on the rise of right-wing anti-immigrant parties. 
The Front National in France, the Dutch Freedom Party in the Netherlands, the Freedom 
Party of Austria (FPÖ), the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK and 
the Northern League (NL) in Italy - to name a few examples - have gained significant 
support over the last years. Presumably, they took advantage of the increasing pressure of 
                                                          
1 We are very grateful to Éupolis Lombardia for giving us access to the very rich dataset this research is based upon and 
to Guglielmo Barone who gave us some historical data on immigrants’ past settlement that are no longer available. We 
thank Massimo Filippini, Patricia Funk, Mario Jametti, Giuliano Masiero, Giovanni Pica, Raphaël Parchet and all other 
researchers at IdEP (USI) for enduring and tireless support and advices. We also thank Maria de Paola, Paolo Naticchioni, 
Fabrizio Patriarca and the other participants at the CIRET conference in Rome in May 2017, as well as Francesco Fasani 
and Libertad Gonzalez for valuable comments. 
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immigrants’ flows combined with the aftermath of a long crisis and slowly recovering 
economies.  
    A wide and fastly growing literature has studied the effect of immigration on the support 
for extremist parties. Even if the majority of researchers find a positive effect of 
immigration on the success of right-wing parties, the empirical evidence is mixed. A 
positive effect has been found in Denmark, Germany, Austria and Italy2. However, 
Steinmayr (2016) finds a negative effect of refugees on the FPÖ vote share. Mendez and 
Cutillas (2014) do not identify any significant effect on support for the anti-immigrants 
coalition in Spain, even though they find a positive effect for African immigrants. Becker 
and Fetzer (2016) find that immigration in the UK has fostered the support for UKIP, 
while Levi et al. (2017) argue that it has only had a short-run positive effect on Brexit and 
UKIP’s support, which vanishes over time. 
Nevertheless, the literature has not investigated whether the votes for these anti-
immigrant parties are mainly ideologically driven or if there is also a rational component 
based on economic factors. Indeed, there might be two economic explanations due to the 
heterogeneity of immigrants relative to natives: (1) the fear of a possible crowding out 
effect in social services and public goods3; (2) the concern of a possible competition of the 
immigrants on the labor market4.  
Our paper investigates the existence of these two economic channels, by exploiting a 
very rich dataset on Lombardy. An important and interesting feature of this setting is the 
negative political cycle that the Northern League was undergoing at the time of elections. 
Despite the negative electoral cycle, the Northern League put immigration at the core of its 
electoral campaign, drawing great attention on the topic especially in the days around the 
elections (see Figure 2.1).  
Moreover, the fortuitous occurrence of a contemporaneous election at the national and 
regional level allows us to investigate whether people react differently to various types of 
elections5. Thanks to a unique - recently released - dataset, we contribute to the existing 
                                                          
2 Düstmann et al. (2016), Harmon (2015), Gerdes and Wadensjo (2010) in Denmark; Otto and Steinhardt (2014) in 
Germany; Halla et al. (2016) in Austria; Barone et al. (2014) in Italy. 
3 Alesina et al. (2001); Alesina and La Ferrara (2000); Alesina et al. (1999).   
4 Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot (2005); Blau and Kahn (2012); Lewis and Peri (2015). 
5 In general, the national and regional elections are not contemporaneous. This coincidence occurred because the 
Lombardy regional government fell before the end of its term. More details will be provided in section 4. 
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literature accounting for income (and tax) differentials between immigrants and Italians6 at 
the municipal level. 
 
 
 
We start from the premise that the ideological component of the support for the NL 
should be invariant across different levels of government. The rational component of the 
support for the NL, instead, should differ between the national and regional elections, 
since the competences of the national and regional governments are different and distinct. 
In fact, the national government manages the planning of the incoming immigration flows 
and the residence policies on the national territory, while the regional government has 
competence on welfare, education, health care and housing of the immigrants. Hence, if 
the economic differences of the immigrants relative to the Italians are important to explain 
voters' behavior, we can argue that voters are not necessarily anti-immigrant per se, but 
there might be two additional explanations. On one hand, the Italians might not want to 
pay services or social security measures that benefit primarily the immigrants (a 
heterogeneity argument à la Alesina, 2001), but on the other hand they might fear the 
competition of immigrants in the labor market. 
Lombardy constitutes a good socio-economic context for our analyses, having the 
highest share of immigrants in its population and being amongst the ones with the highest 
                                                          
6 We carefully avoid the use of the word “natives” because here the discriminating factor is the citizenship, which also 
gives the right to vote. The number of non-natives who have gotten the Italian citizenship in Lombardy now exceeds two 
hundred and twenty thousand individuals, about 20% of the current number of immigrants. 
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support for the Northern League. It is also the richest and most populated Italian region. 
Our setting does not allow us to estimate precisely the crowding out and the labor-market 
competition effects, but – given that they operate in opposite directions – we are able to 
understand which one dominates in shaping voting behavior.  
Our results show that the difference in median incomes – between Italians and 
immigrants – has a positive effect on the NL electoral outcomes, but the interaction 
between that difference and the share of immigrants has a negative and stronger effect. The 
cumulated effect suggests that the labor-market competition effect is thus stronger than the 
crowding out one. We address endogeneity issues using a Card-instrument following the 
methodology suggested by Barone et al. (2014). 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 reviews the existing literature; section 2.3 
details the three – one ideological and two economic – channels through which 
immigration might foster the support for right-wing parties or coalitions; section 2.4 
explains the features of the institutional setting; section 2.5 introduces the data at hand; 
section 2.6 describes the basic empirical model and section 2.7 presents the main results; 
section 2.8 concludes.  
2.2 Literature review 
The impact of immigration on the electoral success of right-wing parties (or coalitions) 
has been recently analyzed by many scholars, in Denmark, Germany, Austria, Spain, UK 
and Italy. Dustmann et al. (2016) analyze the causal effect of refugee migration on voting 
outcomes at the national and municipal elections in Denmark. They find that the allocation 
of larger shares of refugee leads to an increase in the vote share for both anti-immigrant 
parties and center-right parties at large. However, there are heterogeneous effects 
depending on municipal characteristics, especially along the line urban vs non-urban 
municipalities. Refugee allocation influences voter turnout and positioning of anti-
immigrant parties in municipal elections, too.  
Gerdes and Wadensjo (2010) assess the effect of the inflow of refugees on electoral 
outcomes in Denmark at the municipal level. Their analysis - covering the period from 
1989 to 2001 - shows that the shares of refugees is positively associated with the two main 
anti-immigration parties. Harmon (2015) also investigates the voting behavior among 
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Danes, focusing on immigrants. He finds a positive association between immigrant shares 
and right-wing parties’ electoral outcomes. 
Otto and Steinhardt (2014) analyze the effect of immigration inflows in 103 districts in 
the city of Hamburg and argue that an increase in the share of immigrants entails an 
increase in the share of votes of extreme right-wing parties in both federal state and 
national elections. 
Halla et al. (2016) analyze whether immigration positively affect the votes for the 
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), a party with a clear anti-immigration stance. They find 
that a 1% increase in the share of immigrants in a municipality increases the FPÖ votes in 
general elections by about 0.35%. Steinmayr (2016) also focuses on the FPÖ using the 
availability of appropriate housing as an instrument to assess how having received any 
refugees affected the response of voter shares in the 2016 state elections. Unlike all the 
other analyses, he shows that hosting refugees decreases the FPÖ vote share. 
Mendez and Cutillas (2014) study the effect of immigration in Spain on the outcome of 
the national elections from 1996 to 2011, a period in which the immigrant share rose 
sharply. They find that immigration inflow has no significant effect on support for anti-
immigration coalitions. However, splitting the immigrant incidence by nationality, they 
identify a positive impact of African immigrants on anti-immigration coalitions.  
Edo et al. (2018) analyzing the French presidential elections between 1988 and 2017 
find that immigration inflows has a positive effect on the support for the far-right 
candidates, especially if immigrants are non-educated and come from non-EU countries. In 
contrast to their results, Vertier and Viskanic (2018) find a negative effect on the increase 
of the support for the Front National in the presence of temporary migrant-centers. 
Becker and Fetzer (2016) evaluate the electoral success of UKIP at the European 
Parliament elections following the 2004 accession of eight Eastern European countries 
(plus Cyprus and Malta) to the European Union. They display that the significant 
immigration inflow from these new EU members has depressed wages at the lower tail of 
the wage distribution and accrued pressure on public services and housing. Partially in 
contrast to these results, Levi et al. (2017) find that the higher support for UKIP and Brexit 
resulting from an increased immigrant presence is only temporary. Over time, the effect of 
new immigrant inflows on voting behavior progressively vanishes. 
Tabellini (2017) assesses opposition to immigration in the US, even if it is economically 
beneficial, pushing natives’ employment towards better types of jobs and fostering industry 
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productivity and capital utilization. As a reaction, there was a decrease in tax rates and 
public spending and a decrease in the support for the more immigration-favorable party 
(i.e. the Democrats). Mayda et al. (2018), analyzing the US between 1990 and 2010 find that 
high-skilled immigrants’ inflow reduced the support for the Republicans, while low-skilled 
immigrants’ inflow fostered it. They also register a stronger effect among non-urban areas 
and low-skilled workers, mainly due to the fear of an increasing competition on the labor 
market. 
Barone et al. (2014) point their attention to the electoral outcomes of the center-right 
coalition at the municipal level for the 8000 Italian municipalities: they discover that 1% 
increase in the share of immigrants of a municipality is associated with a 0.86% increase in 
the share of votes going to the center-right coalition. The authors also identify 
heterogeneous effects across municipality size, a decrease in voter turnout, an increase in 
protest votes and an effect on mayoral elections. 
The mayoral election itself might affect the inflow of immigrants as pointed out by 
Bracco et al. (2017): immigrants’ location choices are affected by the presence of NL 
mayors. Immigrants do not flee out from NL ruled towns, but they tend to avoid moving 
towards municipalities with a NL mayor. 
Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan (2013) highlight how the two economic channels – 
crowding out of social services and competition in the labor market – can reinforce the 
support for anti-immigrant parties. The success of these parties can – in turn – lead to an 
increased political instability and a subsequent increase in military spending.  
Cattaneo et al. (2013) investigate the labor-market competition channel using a panel for 
the EU-15 countries. They find that when there is an immigrant inflow in a labor-market 
the natives increase their probability of moving to higher-skills jobs. Moreover, this does 
not cause a variation in natives’ unemployment. Therefore, immigrants move the natives 
towards better career paths, which, with a lag of 1-2 years, result in an increase in wage 
incomes. This result is also in line with what Foged and Peri (2015) observe for Denmark: 
refugees inflows push the natives to pursue less manual-intensive occupations. The end 
outcome is an increase in the wages, employment and occupational mobility of native 
unskilled workers. Peri (2012) also finds that immigrants do not crowd-out employment, 
but, instead, have a positive effect on total factor productivity and promote the adoption of 
unskilled-efficient technologies. 
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The literature seems then to suggest that all these three transmission channels – 
ideological, crowding out and labor-market competition – point in the same direction. 
However, this is not so clear-cut: as soon as we take into account the heterogeneity and 
mix of skills and incomes of immigrants and citizens, they might generate different 
outcomes, as we will explain in more detail in the following section. 
2.3 Channels of transmission 
We argue that immigration might affect electoral outcomes trough three main channels: 
(1) “ideological” anti-immigrant feelings; (2) crowding-out effect; (3) labor-market 
competition. As previously mentioned, a high share of immigrants not necessarily implies 
all the effects. 
The “ideological” anti-immigrant feelings can be defined as the set of concerns caused 
by the native’s worry of not being able to preserve effectively their own language, values 
norms and customs when facing significant waves of newcomers.  
Allport (1954) defines prejudice as “a hostile attitude or feeling toward a person solely 
because he or she belongs to a group to which one has assigned objectionable qualities”. 
These prejudices usually cannot be overcome by information and data. Particularly relevant 
are the ideas about groups: grouping people by religion, nationality, or race can give a 
person a faulty sense of identity and self-worth. However, Arrow (1971) argues that people 
turn to prejudice only when they have a lack of information about tradition, customs and 
habits towards the immigrants. 
Castillo and Petrie (2010), in line with Arrow, find evidence of statistical discrimination, 
but only if race is the only available information. Once information is provided people start 
reacting differently, suggesting that the driver of such discrimination is more the lack of 
information than discriminatory preferences. Their results also suggest that a sufficient 
individual-level information about members of other groups could overcome 
discrimination. 
The ideological effect of the immigration – fostered by prejudice and lack of knowledge 
– might be diluted over time as suggested by contact theory (Allport, 1954) in two different 
ways: 
46 
 
• natives might get to know immigrants after an adaptation period, as suggested 
by Levi et al. (2017) 
• natives might get used to immigrants once the share of immigrants has passed a 
certain threshold. 
From an empirical point of view, the two processes act differently: the former vanishes 
over time, starting from the time of arrival and can be captured by a time-specific term, the 
latter generates a non-linearity, hence – as long as the adaptation process is reasonably 
smooth – it can be captured by a polynomial term. Evidence of contact theory has been 
found by Savelkoul et al. (2011) and by Novotny and Polonsky (2011) with respect to the 
prejudices about Muslim immigrants in Europe. 
The crowding-out effect and the labor-market competition can be summarized as 
“economic” channels. In this context, we define the crowding-out effect as the fear that 
poor and/or nonworking immigrants will benefit from the generous European welfare 
system, excluding the natives from the pool of potential beneficiaries. Natives might not 
necessarily fear to have to pay more taxes7, but they could simply be worried that they will 
not be eligible anymore for some specific social benefits, such as the school canteen for 
their children, social housing, etc8. As pointed out by Boeri (2010), these types of concerns 
are relatively more widespread amongst the low-skilled natives. 
Labor-market competition does not necessarily arise because of immigration inflows, as 
it crucially depends on the skill-mix of the immigrants relative to the natives. Card (2001) 
and Borjas (2003) find that immigrants put pressure on natives’ wages where the supply of 
workers is relatively high in a given occupation. Dustmann et al. (2008) carefully assess how 
immigrants affect the labor market and in Dustmann et al. (2013) verify how newcomers 
depress wages for low-skilled natives, while slightly increasing them for high-skilled ones. 
The literature on natives’ attitude towards immigrants (Sheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 
2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Card et al., 2012) highlights how natives perceive 
immigrants with comparable skill sets as generating more competition on the labor market.    
An example could help to clarify both the crowding-out effect and the labor market 
competition. Consider an extreme situation in which the natives have very high skills and 
incomes and immigrants have very low skills and income. In this scenario, there will be no 
                                                          
7 In Italy, for example, there is a cap to the tax rate of the surtax that a municipality can raise.  
8 Local governments might not be allowed to run public deficit (due to an internal stability pact at the 
national level, for example), hence the arrival of new poorer immigrants might actually exclude natives from 
the pool of beneficiaries. 
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crowding-out effect, because none of the natives would be eligible for welfare benefits in 
any case and no labor-market competition, because the job markets for immigrants and 
natives do not overlap. On the other extreme, in a situation in which natives and 
immigrants have very similar skill sets and incomes, there will be both crowding-out and 
labor-market competition, leading to strong frictions between the two groups. To 
summarize, the presence of crowding-out effect and labor-market competition critically 
depends on the relative skill mix of immigrants and natives.  
2.4 Institutional setting 
Italy is a parliamentary republic since 1946. In 1948, there had been the first national 
elections. The parliament is divided into two chambers: a lower one – the House – and an 
upper one – the Senate. The electoral rules are different between the House and the Senate. 
Even though they both follow a proportional rule with a majority premium, attributing 
55% of the seats to the party/coalition with the highest share of votes, the conditions to 
get the majority premium are different between the two chambers. In fact, it is assigned at 
the national level for the House and at the regional level for the Senate. The electoral pools 
are also different: it is necessary to be at least 18 years old to vote for the House, but at 
least 25 years old to vote for the Senate. In general, the members of parliament stay in 
office for five years. However, eight times – out of seventeen – there have been anticipated 
elections, due to the fall of the government and the impossibility of finding a new majority 
in the parliament. 
From 1948 to 1991, the Italian government has been supported by the Christian 
Democrats and later on, since the 1980s, by a coalition – called the “Pentapartito” (party of 
five) – led by the Christian Democrats. In 1992, under the pressure of many corruption 
accusations by a pool of judges based in Milan (the “Mani Pulite”, clean hands, scandal), 
this party system went into crisis. By 1994, almost none of the historical Italian parties had 
survived. This is particularly important for our analysis, because the pre-1992 parties had 
no official stance on immigration, given that it was still a negligible phenomenon. Hence, 
their political ideas should not have affected in any way the location decision of the first 
wave of immigrants in 1991, to which we return below. 
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At the sub-national level, Italy is divided into 20 regions, 15 of which – established in 
1970 – have an ordinary statute and five a special one. We focus our attention on 
Lombardy, the richest and most populated one. It is amongst the 15 ordinary ones and is 
divided into 12 provinces, which are mainly administrative entities and do not necessarily 
reflect the structure of the local economy. As a consequence,  the Italian National Institute 
of Statistics (Istat) has identified 57 smaller local labor systems (henceforth LLS) which 
replicate quite precisely the labor markets. Lombardy is also the Italian region with the 
highest number of municipalities - 1544, as of 2013.  
The region has an overall population of 10 million inhabitants and, as of 2012, a share 
of immigrants of about 12%, accounting for 23% of total immigrants resident in Italy. 
Immigrants are unevenly spread across municipalities, as it can be easily seen from Figure 
2.2: some municipalities have no immigrants, while others have up to a 30% immigrants 
share. At first glance, their concentration is higher in the south-eastern part of the region 
and with a particularly high concentration in the provincial capitals.  
 
 
Lombardy’s electoral rule is quite simple, electing as regional governor the head of the 
party/coalition getting more votes on a regional basis. The list(s) connected to the winning 
candidate obtains 55% of the regional assembly seats if the elected governor gained less 
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than 40% of the votes and 60% of the seats if he received more than 40% of the votes. As 
a rule, each regional parliament stays in office for five years.  
Since the first regional election in 1970, the regional assembly has always ended its term 
and, hence, there have never been contemporaneous elections both at the national and 
regional level in Lombardy. However, during the IX term, many members of the regional 
assembly were arrested for corruption. In October 2012, one of the parties composing the 
center-right majority, the Northern League (henceforth NL), withdrew its support to the 
regional government and the term ended in advance. As a result, for the first time, in 2013, 
there have been contemporaneous election at the national and regional level in Lombardy. 
The Northern League was founded in 1989 and took part in the national elections in 
1992 for the first time. Born as a political movement aimed at defending the rights of the 
northern regions, it rapidly turned into a right-wing party with a strong anti-immigrants 
stance. Over time, their opinions about immigrants became stronger and stronger: the title 
of the paper actually cites one of their electoral posters. Lombardy is currently led by a 
NL’s governor. This makes it an interesting setting for our analyses on populism. 
In 2013, as previously mentioned, Lombardy underwent both national and regional 
elections contemporaneously. Share of votes for the NL – at the municipal level – for the 
election of the House are shown in Figures 2.3: surprisingly, the highest share of votes to 
this party came from the municipalities with the lowest share of immigrants, despite a very 
strong anti-immigrant campaign from the NL. The municipalities voting the most for the 
NL are the ones located in the upper part of the region, with the exception of the province 
capitals. This result is in line with the contrast between urban and rural areas already 
highlighted by Düstmann et al. (2016). 
The competences of the national and regional governments are different and distinct. 
The national government manages the planning of the incoming immigration flows and the 
residence policies on the national territory. Hence, the regional government cannot affect 
immigration as regards flows and residence permits. However, there are four main areas of 
competence of the regional government on immigration: welfare, education, health care 
and housing9. Thus, taking into account the different competences of the two levels of 
                                                          
9 Many local administrators from the NL have tried to deny some welfare, education or housing related benefits to the 
immigrants, but they have not been very effective, given the obligations stated by the Italian Constitution and 
Constitutional Court. 
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government, and controlling for “ideology”, the economic-based votes gained by the NL 
should be different at the national and regional level. 
 
 
 
     
2.5 Data    
Our dataset is a cross-section observing the outcomes of the national and regional 
elections at the municipal level that took place in Lombardy in 2013 and relating them to 
the immigration share as well as other relevant economic and demographic features. 
“Atlante storico delle elezioni” (Historical atlas of the elections, Ministry of Interior) 
provides the data on electoral outcomes of the national – for both the House and the 
Senate – and regional elections of 2013 at the municipal level. From these data, we 
extracted the share of votes received by the Northern League. The contemporaneity of 
these elections allows us to investigate whether the voters behaved differently when casting 
their votes for different levels of government. The Ministry of Interior also provides the 
results of the NL at the previous national and regional elections, in 2008 and 2010 
respectively. 
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Data on immigration rely on two main sources: the ARCHIMEDE project by ISTAT - 
through Éupolis Lombardia10 - and demo.istat, the demographic section of ISTAT. From 
the former we obtain the share of immigrants for 2012 and from the latter the stock of 
immigrants in 2007 and further immigrants’ inflow until 2012.  
The ARCHIMEDE dataset, despite being only a cross-section for 2012 is very detailed, 
comprising almost the entire universe of Lombardy residents, at the individual level, both 
Italians and immigrants. It consists of nearly 10 million individuals, clustered into roughly 
4.4 million households. It relates the information coming from different sources: fiscal 
archives, chambers of commerce, social security archives, insurance archives and Ministry 
of Education archives. From this set of data, we computed several municipal-level variables 
that we used as explanatory and control variables. Specifically we were able to compute the 
average and median income by municipality for both Italians and immigrants, as well as 
their tax bills. Moreover, we were able to calculate the employment rate11 – by Italian 
citizenship – at the Local Labor System level, the gender and age structure of the resident 
population and the share of college graduate. 
From Éupolis Lombardia we also obtained data on the number of firms at the 
municipal level, from which we computed the per-capita number of firms by municipality. 
To construct the instrument for the share of resident immigrants by municipality, we 
estimated (see section 2.6.1.2) the number of resident immigrants by municipality and 
country of origin based on their distribution in 1991 and 2003. Unfortunately, there was no 
data available about immigrants by nationality at the municipal level in 1991. Hence, 
combining the share of immigrants by continental area at the municipal level – provided by 
ISTAT – and data on residence permits by country of origin and nationality released by the 
Italian Ministry of Interior, we imputed immigrants at the municipal level according to the 
nationality breakdown at the provincial level12.  
Summary statistics for our dependent and independent variables are shown in Table 2.1. 
Data on the dependent variables refer to 2013 while the explanatory variables refer to 2012, 
                                                          
10 We are very grateful to Éupolis Lombardia - the regional statistical office, for which we worked as consultants over the 
last three years - for granting us the access to this database. 
11 We prefer to use the employment rate relative to the unemployment one. There are two reasons for this: (1) in times of 
high unemployment, the unemployment rate is often not particularly informative of the well being of the economy, 
because of a high share uf discouraged unemployed; (2) the unemployment measure of the dataset at hand does not 
match the official unemployment statistics because of different definitions. 
12 A clear example of this estimation technique is provided by Barone et al. (2015), footnote 9. 
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unless otherwise stated. Starting from a cross-section database with 1544 observations, we 
had to drop 27 municipalities (26 were miscoded observations and one was an outlier13). 
The share of votes of the NL is, on average, above 15%, but with shares ranging from 
0% up to more than 50%. Figure 2.4 shows how the difference between the share of votes 
between the House and regional elections ranges from -17% and 21% of the votes. It 
delivers a more homogeneous result across provinces (excluding the province of Sondrio). 
We do not consider the House-Senate and Senate-Region difference because the 
composition of the electoral pool is different for the elections of the Senate (only citizens 
above 25 years old can vote).  
The share of immigrants ranges from zero to 30% and its change has been computed 
between 2007 and 2012, the five years’ time span before the elections. Income is defined as 
gross taxable income according to the definition of the personal income tax. Figures 2.5 
and 2.6 show the heterogeneous distribution of the average incomes of the Italians, and the 
difference in median incomes between Italians and immigrants, respectively. The 
employment rate is defined as the share of people having worked in the last 12 months and 
not having received any unemployment benefit, both at the LLS and municipal level. 
Despite having almost the same average, the overall employment rate at the LLS level 
varies between 40% and 73% (see Figure 2.7), while the municipal employment rate of the 
Italians ranges from 12% up to 80%, with a much higher variance. 
                                                          
13 In one municipality there was a resident immigrant with a very high income, which – given the smallness of the 
municipality – generated a very high average income of the immigrants relative to the Italians and a very high and negative 
difference between the average income of the Italians and the immigrants. 
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2.6 Transmission channels and empirical model 
As discussed on Section 2.3 (theory channels), we argue that immigration might affect 
electoral outcomes trough three main channels: (1) “ideological” anti-immigration (𝐼𝐼𝐼); (2) 
crowding-out effect (𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼); (3) labor-market competition (𝐿𝐿𝐼). The relationship 
between votes to anti-immigrant parties and the three channels above can be summarized 
by the following general equation: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜 𝑣𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑣 = 𝑜(𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑜𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑖, 𝑐𝑎𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑖 𝑜𝑜𝑣, 𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑣, 𝑐𝑜𝑐𝑣𝑎𝑜𝑖𝑣) 
As previously pointed out, a high share of immigrants not necessarily implies all the 
effects. In order to investigate the effect of these channels we have first to define them 
properly and design a strategy to distinguish and measure them. 
2.6.1 The “ideological” immigration channel 
2.6.1.1 The basic setup 
The ideological immigration channel will be indicated with the acronym 𝐼𝐼𝐼, to which we 
will add a time suffix to specify what is the one at hand, in case the channel is measured through 
more than one indicator. The standard literature on the electoral effects of immigration 
focuses on the following basic model, simply based on the “ideological” effect of 
immigration: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜 𝑣𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑣 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑣ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑣𝑣 + 𝑋′𝛾 + 𝜀 
where 𝑋′ is a set of socio-political controls. We start by fitting the previous regression but 
using the variation in the share of votes for the Northern League from the last elections 
and the previous ones. The resulting specification is as follws: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013−2008𝐻 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012 + 𝑋𝑚,2012′ 𝜗𝐻 + 𝜀𝑚,2012𝐻 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (1) 
where 𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013−2008𝐻  denotes the change of vote shares of the NL between the elections 
in 2013 and 2008 at the House election and 𝑚 denotes the municipality. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012 is the 
main explanatory variable, i.e. the share of immigrants over the total population in 2012 in 
municipality 𝑚. 𝑋𝑚,2012′  is a set of socio-political municipal controls, i.e., the size of the 
city (below vs above fifteen thousand inhabitants), the share of females and the percentage 
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of each age class in municipality 𝑚 in 2012. The sign of 𝛽1𝐻 is not clear a priori: the 
comparison between Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 should suggest a negative one, but the 
conflicting results found in the literature do not allow us to predict it. 
First, we recognize that the effect of immigration on voting outcomes might be non-
linear in the share of immigrants according to the second aspect of contact theory14. To 
address this we added the square of the share of immigrants in 2012 to the model: 
∗∗∗∗∗  𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013−2008𝐻 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012 + 𝛽2𝐻�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012�2 + 𝑋𝑚,2012′ 𝜗𝐻 + 𝜀𝑚,2012𝐻 ∗∗∗ (2) 
Moreover, more recent research (Levi et al., 2017) has pointed out how the support for 
right-wing parties resulting from an increased immigrant presence is only temporary. The 
inflow of new immigrants matters the most, since - over time - its effect on voting behavior 
progressively vanishes. This is in line with the predictions of one aspect of contact theory. 
To account for this process, we add to the share of immigrants in 2012 its growth rate 
between 2007 and 2012 (𝐼𝐼𝐼2012−2007) and estimate the following equation: 
∗∗∗∗  𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013−2008𝐻 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012−2007 + 𝑋𝑚,2012′ 𝜗𝐻 + 𝜀𝑚,2012𝐻 ∗∗ (3) 
If recent inflows are driving the support for the Northern League, we expect the sign of 
𝛽2
𝐻 to be positive and significant.  
Finally, we combine the two aspects of the contact theory and allow both for a short 
run effect and for non-linearities in the share of immigrants: 
𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013−2008𝐻 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012−2007 + 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  + 𝛽3𝐻�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012�2 + 𝑋𝑚,2012′ 𝜗𝐻 + 𝜀𝑚,2012𝐻 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (4) 
Here, we allow the effect of immigration to be both increasing for municipalities with a low 
share of immigrants and decreasing for municipalities with a higher one. If this is the case, 
we expect the sign of 𝛽3𝐻 to be negative and significant. 
Combining these aspects, we can then define the “ideological immigration channel”: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚′ 𝛽𝐻 = 𝛽1𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012−2007 + 𝛽3𝐻�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚,2012�2 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (5) 
2.6.1.2 Endogeneity 
It is important to highlight that there is a potential endogeneity issue associated to the share 
of immigrants: the immigrants’ location decisions are not random, because they clearly 
                                                          
14 Cfr. Section 3.3 for further details. 
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depend – through a network effect – on the past distribution of immigrants; moreover, the 
political orientation of the voters towards the Northern League might have affected the 
location decisions of the immigrants. To deal with this endogeneity issue we instrument the 
share of immigrants both in 2007 and in 2012 and we take their difference to get the 
instrument for the growth rate of immigrants over that five years period.  
To predict these shares we use a shift-share procedure15 based on the distribution of 
immigrants by nationality and municipality in 1991 and 2003, respectively. The choice of 
1991 as base year is particularly handy, because none of the current parties had already 
taken part in a national election back then and the pre-existing parties had no clear stance 
on immigration issues, because the immigrants’ presence was negligible. Besides the 1991 
data, the oldest available data about immigrants by nationality are from 2003. To compute 
the instrument, we implement the following formula16: 
∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑚𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑐,−𝑚𝑁𝑚=1
𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑐𝑚𝑐
 
Where 𝛾𝑚𝑚 is the immigrants’ share originating from country 𝑐 and residing in 
municipality 𝑚, in 1991 (2003). 𝐼𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑚𝑐,−𝑚 is the region-level number of 
immigrants coming from country 𝑐, in year 2007 (2012), net of the participation of 
municipality 𝑚 to the total.  𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑐𝑚𝑐 is the overall population in municipality 𝑚 and 
in year 𝑣. Finally, 𝛥 is the number of top foreign nationalities in Lombardy in 2007 and 
201217. 
 
 
2.6.2 The “rational economic channels” 
If the votes for the Northern league are not purely anti-immigration per se, the economic 
differences between the Italians and the immigrants might play a role and two “economic” 
channels could come into play. The economic heterogeneity (or homogeneity) of the 
immigrants with respect to the Italians can have different outcomes. If immigrants are very 
different from the Italians, there might show up a “crowding-out effect”. On the contrary, 
if immigrants are very similar to the Italians, there might be an increase in the competition 
                                                          
15 We follow the procedure suggested by Cortes and Pan (2015), as previously done by Barone et al. (2014). 
16 This formula has been already used by Barone et al. (2014). 
17 𝛥 has been set equal to 15 and we selected these 15 top nationalities: Romania, Morocco, Albania, Egypt, 
China, Philippines, India, Peru, Ecuador, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri-Lanka, Tunisia, Ghana, Brazil. 
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on the labor market and voters could vote against the immigrants because they believe that 
“immigrants steal their jobs”.  
 
2.6.2.1 Crowding-out effect channel 
To capture how economically different the Italians are from the immigrants – after 
controlling for the average income of the Italians – we computed the difference between 
the median incomes of the Italians relative to the median incomes of the immigrants18. The 
model we estimated is the following: 
𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013−2008𝐻 = 𝛼 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚′ 𝛽𝐻 + 𝛾0𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑖𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛾1𝐻𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼−𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ +𝑋𝑚,2012′ 𝜗𝐻 + 𝜀𝑚,2012𝐻 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (6) 
where 𝑎𝑣𝑖𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼  stands for the average income of the voters in 2012 in municipality 𝑚, 
i.e. the level of economic development of the municipality, and 𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼−𝐼𝐼𝐼 is the 
difference in median incomes between the Italians and the immigrants in 2012 in 
municipality 𝑚. We use the average level of income because we consider it as a proxy for 
the welfare of the municipality, given the progressivity of the fiscal system. On the other 
hand, we use the difference in median incomes because it captures better the actual relative 
position of the immigrants relative to the income of the median Italian19. 𝛾1𝐻 is our 
coefficient of main interest: if it is positive and significant we can argue that the crowding-
out effect plays a role, increasing the support for the NL if the immigrants are poor relative 
to the voters. Vice-versa, if 𝛾1𝐻 is negative or not significant we can conclude that the 
crowding-out effect is not a determinant of the electoral success of the Northern League. 
We also want to control for the different effect that the heterogeneity between Italians and 
immigrants might have depending on the share of immigrants living in municipality 𝑚. To 
account for that we add an interaction term between the difference in median incomes and 
the change in the share of immigrants in 2012. We then estimate the following model: 
𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013−2008𝐻 = 𝛼 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚′ 𝛽𝐻 + 𝛾0𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑖𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛾1𝐻𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼−𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  + 𝛾2𝐻�𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼−𝐼𝐼𝐼 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼′𝑚� + 𝑋𝑚,2012′ 𝜗𝐻 + 𝜀𝑚,2012𝐻 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (7) 
                                                          
18 It is worth noting that labor-market competition does not necessarily arise because of immigration inflows; 
it crucially depends on the abilities of the immigrants relative to the natives. If they are looking for jobs in 
sectors that are different from the Italians’ preferred ones, the labor markets could not overlap and there 
might be no variation in the labor market competition. 
19 It is worth noting that the electoral pool contains only Italians, because the right to vote depends on the 
citizenship. Hence, the median adult Italian coincides with the median voter. 
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If the crowding out effect matters – i.e. 𝛾1𝐻 is positive and significant – and it has a 
different impact on the support for the NL depending on the share of resident immigrants, 
we expect 𝛾2𝐻 to be positive and significant. On the other hand, if 𝛾2𝐻 is not significant it 
implies that the share of immigrants does not affect the impact of the difference in median 
incomes on the support for the NL. Finally, if 𝛾2𝐻 is negative and significant, it suggests 
that an increase in the share of immigrants does not matter when the immigrants are 
different from the voters. Specifically, if Italians are significantly richer than the 
immigrants, they might be already crowded-out. 
We then define the “crowding-out effect channel” as follows: 
∗∗∗ 𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚
′ 𝛾𝐻 = 𝛾0𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑖𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛾1𝐻𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼−𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛾2𝐻�𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼−𝐼𝐼𝐼 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼′𝑚�        (8) 
and conclude that  the importance of the crowding out channel depends on the positivity 
and significance of the 𝛾1𝐻 and 𝛾2𝐻 coefficients. 
2.6.2.2 Labor market competition channel 
Isolating the labor market competition channel (LMC) is not straightforward. Firstly, we 
have to control for the employment level of the Italians, to take into account the local 
employment status. In fact, areas with higher employment rate could simply express a 
different support for the NL depending on the party’s economic agenda. This can be 
accomplished in two ways: 
• computing the employment rate of the Italians at the local labor system level 
• using local labor system fixed effects and then controlling for the employment rate 
of the Italians at the municipal level 
Once we have controlled for the local labor market status, we have to investigate how 
immigration – conditional on employment – affects the support for the Northern League. 
To do that, we interact the employment rate of the Italians with the change in the share of 
immigrants between 2007 and 2012 at the municipal level. The resulting model that we 
estimate is:  
𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013−2008𝐻 = 𝛼 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚′ 𝛽𝐻 + 𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚′ 𝛾𝐻 + 𝛿0𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  + 𝛿1𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼′𝑚� + 𝑋𝑚,2012′ 𝜗𝐻 + 𝜀𝑚,2012𝐻 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (9) 
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where we control for the employment rate of the Italians at the LLS in 2012 (coefficient 
𝛿0
𝐻) and we do not use LLS fixed effects. Vice versa, if we use LLS-effects, we obtain the 
following model: 
𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013−2008𝐻 = 𝛼 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚′ 𝛽𝐻 + 𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚′ 𝛾𝐻 + 𝛿0𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  + 𝛿1𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼′𝑚) + 𝑋𝑚,2012′ 𝜗𝐻 + 𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝜀𝑚,2012𝐻 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (10) 
where we control for the employment rate of the voters at the municipal level in 2012 
(coefficient 𝛿0𝐻) and use local labor system fixed effects (𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐿).  
In both specifications the coefficient of main interest is 𝛿1𝐻, which captures the effect of 
the interaction of the change in the share of immigrants between 2007 and 2012 with the 
employment rate of the Italians at the LLS or municipal level respectively. We expect 𝛿1𝐻 to 
be positive and significant if the labor-market competition channel actually matters. 
Instead, if 𝛿1𝐻 is not significant, it means that the presence of immigrants does not affect 
the support for the NL through the labor-market. An extreme case would be the one in 
which 𝛿1𝐻 is negative and significant. It would be possible in a situation in which the 
employment rate of the Italians is very high and there would be complementarity between 
the skill set of the Italians and the immigrants.  
We then define the “labor market competition channel” as: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝑚′ 𝛿𝐻 = 𝛿0𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛿1𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼′𝑚� ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (11) 
when not using LLS fixed effects. Vice versa, with LLS fixed effects, it becomes: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗∗∗∗  𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑚′ 𝛿𝐻 = 𝛿0𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛿1𝐻�𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑚,2012𝐼𝐼𝐼 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼′𝑚� ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (12) 
We can finally sum up our model with the following equation: 
𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013−2008𝐻 = 𝛼 + (𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐿 +)𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚′ 𝛽𝐻 + 𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚′ 𝛾𝐻 + 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  + 𝐿𝐿𝐼(𝐿𝐿𝐿,)𝑚′ 𝛿𝐻 + 𝑋𝑚,2012′ 𝜗𝐻 + 𝜀𝑚,2012𝐻  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (13) 
It is now important to highlight what are the reasons to consider the inclusion of LLS fixed 
effect in our model: 
• Even if the administrative unit above municipalities is the province, provinces just 
define administrative areas and have little to do with economic and labor system 
areas; 
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• The local labor systems are very often cross-provinces; 
• The LLS’, by definition, have much more homogeneous labor markets than the 
provinces, hence, if we still find an effect of immigration on the support for the NL 
through the municipal employment rate of the Italians, this effect is much cleaner. 
Adding the LLS fixed effects – of course – comes at a cost: 
• The loss of many degrees of freedom, because there are 57 additional parameters to 
estimate 
• The loss of a lot of cross-section variability in the share of the immigrants among 
LLS, which causes the significance of the main effect of immigration on the 
support for the NL to fade away.  
2.6.3 Exploiting elections contemporaneity to isolate the rational 
economic channels 
Previously, we have distinguished the transmission channels through which immigration 
fosters the support for the NL in “ideological” and “rational economic”. Moreover, in 
section 2.4 we pointed out that the national and regional elections where unusually 
contemporaneous in 2013 and that the national and regional governments have different 
competences with respect to immigration management. Hence, if the votes for the 
Northern League are purely anti-immigrants and the rational economic channels do not 
play any role in explaining voters’ behavior, the electoral outcomes should be the same at 
the national and regional elections. This is not the case, as clearly reported in Table 2.1. 
The vote share of the NL is – on average – higher at the national level and, even if the 
minimum and maximum share of votes are quite similar at the national and regional level, 
when we take the difference between the two outcomes it is easy to see that they can differ 
by up to 20%. These differences lead us to wonder whether by taking the difference 
between the two electoral outcomes we can shed light on how the rational channels affect 
the NL support across different levels of government.  
We state and discuss a set of assumptions that are needed to be able to claim that the 
difference between the two elections is driven only by the rational channels: 
• Same timing, i.e. the elections are contemporaneous; 
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Table 2.1 - Summary statistics 
  
      
 
           
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
              
       Electoral outcomes 
            
 
NL vote shares - House 1517 16.8% 6.7% 2.9% 49.2% 
 
NL vote shares - Region 1517 15.8% 6.8% 0.0% 52.1% 
 
Δ NL votes: House 2008-2013 1492 -10% 4% -28% 10% 
 
Δ NL votes: House vs Region 1517 1.0% 3.6% -16.8% 21.3% 
       Immigration indexes - "ideological" component 
            
 
Share of immigrants 1542 8.9% 4.7% 0.0% 30.4% 
 
Share of immigrants in 2007 1485 6.8% 3.8% 0.0% 23.0% 
 
Share of immigrants growth 2007-12 1472 2.1% 1.8% -5.8% 14.0% 
 
Instrument for 2012 1524 7.1% 5.5% 0.0% 41.8% 
 
Instrument for 2007 1541 3.8% 4.5% 0.0% 61.6% 
       Economic explanatory variables "rational" component 
            
 
Italians avg income 1542 18'331 3'050 4'406 38'889 
 
Δ median income Ita-Imm 1535 11'358 3'510 -8'098 19'820 
 
Employment rate by LLS 1542 67.4% 5.8% 39.4% 72.9% 
 
Municipal Italians empl. Rate 1542 67.1% 7.5% 12.2% 80.7% 
       Controls 
            
 
Firms per capita by municipality 1541 0.08 0.101 0.0 3.40 
 
Municipal population 1541 6'543 36'060 33 1'357'310 
 
Towns above 15k inhabitants 1542 Below: 1434 (93%) Above: 108 (7%) 
 
Share of females 1541 50.2% 1.4% 40.0% 56.2% 
 
Population aged 0-14 1541 14.1% 2.5% 1.9% 22.0% 
 
Population aged 15-34 1541 20.6% 2.3% 8.0% 30.4% 
 
Population aged 35-64 1541 44.9% 2.0% 33.9% 56.0% 
 
Population aged 65-plus 1541 20.4% 4.7% 5.5% 51.2% 
 
Share of college graduate 1542 9.2% 3.6% 0.0% 35.5% 
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• Voters are fully informed: this assumption is useful, but it is not strictly necessary, 
because we are not claiming to fully identify the magnitude of the rational channel, 
we are just arguing that the difference in elections’ outcome is driven by the most 
informed voters – which understand that the two level of governments have 
different competences with respect to immigration. Hence, we slightly relax this 
assumption by assuming that the voters who cast different votes for the two levels 
of government are fully informed; 
• The electoral systems are the same across levels of government: they are indeed 
extremely similar, the only two difference being the possibility to express a disjoint 
vote and preferences at the regional elections20 
• Italians vote for the party and not for the people in the list: it is not possible to vote 
for a party and express preferences for candidates listed in a different one, hence, 
firstly, people have to decide which party to support. Moreover, it is hard to argue 
that the candidate to the regional elections was significantly different from the 
national party, because in 2013 Maroni was both the national secretary of the NL 
and the NL candidate as regional governor. His stances about immigration have 
also been made very clear by his service as an Interior minister between 2008 and 
2011. As a result, the party line is expected to be the same at both elections. 
We compare the House elections with the regional ones, because for the Senate elections 
the electoral pool is smaller, being required to be above 25 years old to vote for the 
senators election. Taking the difference between the NL share of votes at the House and 
regional elections, we estimate the following model: 
𝛥𝛥𝐿𝑚,2013𝐻𝐻 = 𝛼 + (𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐿 +)𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑚′ 𝛽𝐻𝐻 + 𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑚′ 𝛾𝐻𝐻 + 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ +𝐿𝐿𝐼(𝐿𝐿𝐿,)𝑚′ 𝛿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑋𝑚,2012′ 𝜗𝐻𝐻 + 𝜀𝑚,2012𝐻𝐻  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  (14) 
If the “ideological” transmission channel does not vary across elections’ level, we expect 
𝛽𝐻𝐻 to be not statistically significant. To check this we perform a joint F-test on the 
coefficients associated to the 𝐼𝐼𝐼 channel. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis of joint 
non-significance we can conclude that the ideological component does not vary across the 
                                                          
20 Both at the national and regional level, the electoral system is a proportional one, with a majority premium 
awarded to the winning candidate. The only differences between the two systems regard the disjoint vote and 
preferences. Specifically, at the regional elections, a voter can vote for a party but vote for a different 
governor candidate. Moreover, she can express up to two (if of different gender) preferences for the 
candidates to the regional assembly. However, the preferences have to be expressed for the supported party. 
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different levels of election. On the other hand, if 𝛾𝐻𝐻 or 𝛿𝐻𝐻 are significant, it means that 
the economic explanatory variables can explain the non-ideological component of the votes 
gained by the NL. The interpretation of their sign is the same suggested for the previous 
specifications. We also control for the usual set of socio-economic features appearing in 
𝑋𝑚,2012′ . Finally, we perform the usual robustness check with LLS fixed effects and IV 
estimates on the full model. 
2.7 Main econometric results  
2.7.1 Baseline results 
Table 2.2 (i.e. equations 1 – 4) displays the baseline results regarding (only) the IIC. The 
odd numbered columns show row estimates controlling only for size of municipalities, 
while the even numbered columns include municipal level socio-economic controls. 
First of all, it is important to bear in mind that the previous literature analyze situations 
in which the anti-immigrants parties were significantly increasing their share of votes. In 
our framework, however, the share of votes of Northern League was – on average – 
decreasing between 2008 and 2013, due to two main reasons: (1) the Northern League has 
generally gathered a strong support in Lombardy, so their starting point was generally high; 
(2) the electoral cycle was not favorable to the center-right coalition, to which the NL 
belongs. Hence, we expect some of our controls to behave differently from the previously 
analyzed contexts, given that we are focusing on small and not-necessarily positive 
variations in the share of votes. 
The first two columns show the results for the main effect of the stock of immigrants 
(eq. 1), columns (3) and (4) account for the possible non-linear effect of immigration on 
voters’ behavior (eq. 2), columns (5) and (6) account for short vs long-run effects (eq. 3) 
and the last two columns allow for both (eq. 4). We find that the stock of immigrants has a 
positive and statistically significant effect, which is however non-linear, as the coefficient 
associated to its square is negative and strongly significant. The last four columns seem to 
suggest that there is no significant short-run effect of new immigrants’ inflow. In the evenly 
numbered columns, we also control for a set of municipal characteristics, such as the share 
of females,  
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the population structure by age, the share of college graduate, number of firms per capita 
and a dummy for towns with more than 15k inhabitants. The share of female is not 
significant in any specification, suggesting that there is no gender specificity at work here. 
The same goes for the share of college graduate and the number of firms per capita. The 
youngest and the oldest seem to have a lower preference for the Northern League, relative 
to our reference category, which are voters aged 35-64 years old. It is important to 
underline how, in contrast with the previous literature – especially with respect to Barone 
et al. (2014) and Dustmann et al. (2016) – we find a positive and significant effect for big 
municipalities, meaning that the Northern League – while still receiving less support than in 
the countryside – relatively gained support in bigger municipalities with respect to small 
ones. The municipal population size, however, has a non-linear effect. If we control, as a 
robustness check, for the square of age it turns out that the associated coefficient is 
negative, again suggesting that bigger municipalities still react differently21. 
2.7.2 Introducing the “rational” economic channels 
We now introduce in turn the “rational” channels, analyzing more extensively the results 
shown in Table 2.2. In Table 2.3, we add the COE and LM channels to the specification of 
column (4) of Table 2.2. All columns include socio-economic controls and column (4) 
includes LLS fixed effects too. Column (1) controls for the average income of the Italians 
and the difference in median incomes between Italians and immigrants. The former shows 
a negative effect, suggesting that richer municipalities exhibit a lower support for the NL. 
The latter has a positive effect, suggesting that the larger the difference in incomes between 
Italians and immigrants, the bigger the support for the NL. 
Column (2) adds the interaction between the share of immigrants and the difference in 
median incomes. As expected the average income of the Italians has a negative effect on 
the variation in the votes for the NL and the delta in median incomes has a positive one, 
even if not significant. However, when we add the LM channel at the LLS level (column 3), 
also the interaction between the share of immigrants and the difference in median incomes 
becomes strongly significant. This suggests that, on the one hand, richer areas show a lower 
support for the NL, but, on the other hand, this support increases the more the immigrants 
are poor relative to the voters. The positivity of the coefficient associated to the interaction 
between  
                                                          
21 Estimates for non-linearities in population are available upon request. 
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Table 2.3 - Effect of immigration on the variation of the share of votes for the Northern League at 
the House's elections between 2008 and 2013 - Squared specification 
     
VARIABLES 
Dependent variable: Delta NL share of votes 2013-
2008, House elections 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Share of immigrants 0.503*** 1.172** 0.580 0.334 
 
(0.110) (0.541) (0.626) (0.579) 
Share of immigrants squared in 2012 -1.265*** -1.219*** -1.383*** 0.0325 
 
(0.399) (0.404) (0.412) (0.302) 
Ln Italians avg income -0.0299** -0.0304** -0.0378** 0.0141 
 
(0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0175) (0.0175) 
Ln Δ median income Ita-Imm 0.00649* 0.0113* 0.0159*** 0.0115 
 
(0.00371) (0.00599) (0.00571) (0.00703) 
Ln(Δ med income Ita-Imm) × Imm share 
 
-0.0734 -0.156** -0.0805 
  
(0.0610) (0.0639) (0.0790) 
Italians empl. rate by LLS 
  
-0.119 
 
   
(0.0865) 
 Employment rate blls × Imm share 
  
2.042** 
 
   
(0.905) 
 Municipal Italians empl. rate 
   
-0.172*** 
    
(0.0531) 
Employment rate bm × Imm share 
   
0.667 
    
(0.467) 
Town with Pop>15k 0.0107** 0.0112** 0.0101** 0.00572** 
 
(0.00454) (0.00445) (0.00432) (0.00231) 
Constant 0.314** 0.274* 0.391** -0.191 
 
(0.139) (0.152) (0.156) (0.171) 
     Socio-economical controls YES YES YES YES 
Local labor system fixed effects NO NO NO YES 
     Observations 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466 
R-squared 0.136 0.138 0.148 0.060 
Number of LLS 
   
57 
     Clustered (at the LLS level) s.e. in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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the delta in median incomes and the share of immigrants – despite being counter-intuitive 
– is consistent with the crowding-out theory. In fact, an increase in the share of 
immigrants, when the median incomes between the two groups are very different, loosens 
– or might even eliminate – the competition between immigrants and Italians about social 
services. These results seem to confirm the importance of the crowding-out effect channel 
in shaping voters behavior. 
As for the LM channel, on the one hand, the employment rate of the Italians has a 
negative effect, but it is not significant. On the other hand, the interaction between the 
employment rate and the share of immigrants has a positive and significant effect, 
suggesting that – holding constant the employment rate of the voters – the presence of 
immigrants fosters the support for the NL. It is also worth highlighting that the main effect 
of immigrants looses significance in this specification. The square of the stock of 
immigrants remains negative and strongly significant across columns (1) to (3). 
Lastly, column (4) introduces LLS fixed effects and accounts for the LM channel at the 
municipal level. The IIC and COEC show no significance in this specification. The 
employment rate of the Italians at the municipal level exhibits a negative and significant 
effect, while the corresponding interaction term is positive, but not significant.  
At least qualitatively, the results for the LMC hold their relevance across columns (3) 
and (4): the employment rate of the voters has a negative effect on the NL performance, 
even when accounting for LLS fixed effects; its interaction with the share of immigrants, 
on the other hand, increases the support for the NL. These results are in line with our prior 
that holding constant the employment rate, an increase in the share of immigrants – 
augmenting the labor market competition – fosters the performance of the NL. In 
conclusion, when we properly control for labor market specificities, the labor market 
channel is the one that matters the most. 
Table 2.4 explores the full model, i.e. deepens the analyses of the last two columns of 
Table 2.2 and aims to check whether the results of Table 2.3 are robust to the introduction 
of the short-term effect of new inflows.  The growth rate of immigrants is not significant 
across the specifications of columns (1) to (3). The same is true for the corresponding 
interactions terms, except for column (2), where we interact the growth share of 
immigrants with the employment rate of the Italians at the LLS level. Here, it exhibits a 
positive and significant effect, suggesting that new inflows are associated with a perceived 
higher competition on the labor market, increasing the support for the NL. 
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Table 2.4 - Effect of immigration on the variation of the share of votes for the Northern League at 
the House's elections between 2008 and 2013 - Full IIC specification 
        
VARIABLES 
Dependent variable: Delta NL share of votes 
2013-2008, House elections 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 Share of immigrants 
 
1.507*** 
 
0.786 
 
0.841 
 
  
(0.541) 
 
(0.712) 
 
(0.577) 
 Immigration growth rate over 5 years 
 
0.0486 
 
0.00112 
 
0.0233 
 
  
(0.0476) 
 
(0.0522) 
 
(0.0512) 
 Share of immigrants squared in 2012 
 
-1.228*** 
 
-1.397*** 
 
0.0278 
 
  
(0.412) 
 
(0.423) 
 
(0.316) 
 Ln Italians avg income 
 
-0.0313** 
 
-0.0377** 
 
0.0127 
 
  
(0.0130) 
 
(0.0167) 
 
(0.0184) 
 Ln Δ median income Ita-Imm 
 
0.0169** 
 
0.0223*** 
 
0.0196*** 
 
  
(0.00633) 
 
(0.00544) 
 
(0.00608) 
 Ln(Δ med income Ita-Imm) × Imm share 
 
-0.109* 
 
-0.183*** 
 
-0.140* 
 
  
(0.0609) 
 
(0.0614) 
 
(0.0742) 
 Ln(Δ med income Ita-Imm) × Imm gr 5 years 
 
-0.00557 
 
-0.00858 
 
-0.00504 
 
  
(0.00501) 
 
(0.00675) 
 
(0.00651) 
 Italians empl. rate by LLS 
   
-0.173* 
   
    
(0.0878) 
   Employment rate blls × Imm share 
   
2.114** 
   
    
(0.988) 
   Employment rate blls × Imm gr 5 years 
   
0.114** 
   
    
(0.0461) 
   Municipal Italians empl. rate 
     
-0.196*** 
 
      
(0.0593) 
 Employment rate bm × Imm share 
     
0.723 
 
      
(0.503) 
 Employment rate bm × Imm gr 5 years 
     
0.0326 
 
      
(0.0487) 
 Town with Pop>15k 
 
0.0142** 
 
0.0128** 
 
0.00729** 
 
  
(0.00657) 
 
(0.00636) 
 
(0.00321) 
 Constant 
 
0.237 
 
0.379** 
 
-0.240 
 
  
(0.155) 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.179) 
 Socio-economical controls 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 Local labor system fixed effects (57) 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 Observations 
 
1,408 
 
1,408 
 
1,408 
 R-squared 
 
0.141 
 
0.157 
 
0.064 
 F-test on COEC: Prob>F  0.0172  0.0006  0.0075  
F-test on LMC: Prob>F 
 
/ 
 
0.0241 
 
0.0094 
         Clustered (at the LLS level) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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What is important to emphasize is that the coefficients associated to the COEC are 
jointly significant at the 1% level across columns (1) to (3). Moreover, the coefficients 
associated to the LMC are significant to the 5% level for column (2) and at the 1% level for 
column (3). Having stated that COEC and LMC are relevant to voters’ behavior it is 
interesting to evaluate which of the two channels has the larger impact. The net22 effect of 
LMC is larger than COEC’s one, the former accounting for 5.25% of the NL share of 
votes and the latter for 4.65%.  
Finally, what is the effect of an increase in the share of immigrants on the support for 
the NL? Our model predicts that a 2.1% increase of the share of immigrants – above the 
average – in the last 5 years prior to the elections is associated to a 2.25% increase in the 
NL share of votes. 
Table 2.5 shows IV estimates of columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.2 specifications, with the 
first two columns referring to eq. 1 and the last two columns referring to eq. 2. Odd 
numbered columns only include a dummy for towns with more than 15 thousand 
inhabitants, while even numbered ones include also the other usual municipal controls. 
Here, we instrumented the share of immigrants and its square with a Card-instrument with 
2003 as base-year and its square, respectively.  The implied effect of a 2.1% increase of the 
share of immigrants is a 1.04% increase in the support for the NL. 
Lastly, we also produced IV estimates for Table 2.4. Here, having three – the stock of 
immigrants in 2012, its square and its variation between 2007 and 2012 – potentially 
endogenous variables, we use three different instrument: the estimated share of immigrants 
in 2012 based on immigrants’ distribution in 2003, its square and its difference with respect 
to estimated share of immigrants in 2007 based on immigrants’ distribution in 1991. 
Unfortunately, our estimates on the full model loose significance (see Table B.1). However, 
it has to be noted that if we estimate the baseline specification including only the IIC 
without the growth rate immigrants and controlling for the socio-economic variables at the 
municipal level, even the IV estimated remain significant (see Table 2.5) . The loss of 
significance of the full model is likely to depend on the high number of variables that had 
to be instrumented (up to 7 in the full specifications), due to the interaction terms relative 
to the COE and LMC channels. 
  
                                                          
22 By net COEC and net LMC, we mean net of the effect of the average income and employment rate of the 
Italians, respectively. 
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Tabella 2.5 - Effect of immigration on the variation of the share of votes for the Northern League 
at the House's elections between 2008 and 2013 - IV estimates 
VARIABLES  
Dependent variable:  
Difference in the NL share of votes 2013-2008 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Share of immigrants in 2012 0.143** 0.256*** 0.423* 0.674*** 
 
(0.0577) (0.0554) (0.243) (0.228) 
Share of immigrants squared in 2012 
  
-1.296 -1.987** 
   
(1.041) (0.995) 
Town with Pop>15k 0.0111** 0.00965** 0.0103** 0.0104** 
 
(0.00518) (0.00465) (0.00515) (0.00448) 
Share of females 
 
0.0689 
 
-0.0193 
  
(0.103) 
 
(0.118) 
Population aged 0-14 
 
-0.506*** 
 
-0.487*** 
  
(0.124) 
 
(0.127) 
Population aged 15-34 
 
-0.605*** 
 
-0.577*** 
  
(0.151) 
 
(0.151) 
Population aged 65-plus 
 
-0.268** 
 
-0.242** 
  
(0.105) 
 
(0.105) 
Share of college graduate 
 
-0.00232 
 
-0.0257 
  
(0.0333) 
 
(0.0375) 
Firms per capita 
 
-0.0141 
 
-0.0140 
  
(0.0109) 
 
(0.00995) 
Constant -0.111*** 0.0964 -0.123*** 0.112 
 
(0.00656) (0.0662) (0.0115) (0.0700) 
Observations 1,474 1,473 1,474 1,473 
R-squared 0.030 0.122 0.039 0.126 
     Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables in italics 
are instrumented with a Card-instrument with base-year 2003 and its square, respectively. 
 
2.7.3 Trying to isolate the “rational” economic channels 
Table 2.6 reproduces Table 2.4, using as a dependent variable the difference between 
the NL’s electoral performance at the House relative to the Regional level, following 
specification (14). As usual, the even columns include socio-economic controls, while the 
odd ones do not.  
The results from the first two columns suggest that only the stock of immigrants is 
mildly significant in this context. However, the F-test of joint significance fails to reject the 
null hypothesis of joint non-significance for the IIC. The same is true for COE channel.  
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Table 2.6 - Effect of the COEC and LMC on the difference of the share of votes for the Northern 
League between the House and Regional elections in 2013 
VARIABLES 
Dependent variable: Delta NL share of votes 
House vs Regional elections, 2013 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Share of immigrants 1.575** 1.528* 0.800 0.842 
 (0.781) (0.765) (0.568) (0.584) 
Immigration growth rate over 5 years 0.0247 0.0278 0.0233 0.0296 
 (0.0450) (0.0435) (0.0445) (0.0420) 
Share of immigrants squared in 2012 0.618 0.581 0.639** 0.586** 
 (0.597) (0.582) (0.266) (0.257) 
Ln Italians avg income -0.0331** -0.0300* -0.0415*** -0.0353** 
 (0.0133) (0.0177) (0.0134) (0.0171) 
Ln Δ median income Ita-Imm 0.01000 0.00929 0.0131 0.0125 
 (0.00958) (0.0101) (0.00837) (0.00856) 
Ln(Δ med income Ita-Imm) × Imm share -0.0122 -0.00539 -0.0696 -0.0692 
 (0.0829) (0.0863) (0.0748) (0.0761) 
Ln(Δ med income Ita-Imm) × Imm gr 5 years -0.00753 -0.00768 -0.00387 -0.00442 
 (0.00726) (0.00698) (0.00586) (0.00563) 
Italians empl. rate by LLS 0.170 0.164   
 (0.114) (0.108)   
Employment rate blls × Imm share -2.366** -2.383**   
 (1.177) (1.135)   
Employment rate blls × Imm gr 5 years 0.0523 0.0505   
 (0.0429) (0.0440)   
Municipal Italians empl. rate   0.0263 0.0215 
   (0.0497) (0.0495) 
Employment rate bm × Imm share   -0.510 -0.522 
   (0.322) (0.333) 
Employment rate bm × Imm gr 5 years   0.0180 0.0162 
   (0.0332) (0.0327) 
Town with Pop>15k 0.00134 0.00371* 0.00144 0.00241 
 (0.00207) (0.00216) (0.00164) (0.00167) 
Constant 0.138 0.155 0.288* 0.299 
 (0.125) (0.171) (0.148) (0.196) 
Socio-economical controls NO YES NO YES 
Local labor system fixed effects (57) NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,432 1,432 1,432 1,432 
R-squared 0.053 0.062 0.055 0.071 
F-test on IIC: Prob>F 0.155 0.1586 0.0924 0.0988 
Notes: Clustered (at the LLS level) standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Despite the non-significance of the employment rate of the Italians, the LMC is jointly 
significant nearly23 at the 5% level, thanks to the strong significance of the interaction 
between the employment rate and the share of immigrants.  
If we compare these results with the ones from Table 2.4, though, it is clear that the 
coefficients associated to the LMC channel have an opposite sign. This means that – 
contrary to what we expected – the LMC is stronger for the regional elections and voters 
trust more in the regional government when asking for protection on the labor market. 
Columns (3) and (4) account for LLS fixed effects, thus, the employment rate and its 
interactions are computed at the municipal level. In this context we just24 reject the null 
hypothesis of non-significance of the IIC at the 10% level, due to the significance of the 
square of the stock of immigrants. The joint F-test is not significant for the COE and 
LMC, even if the average income of the Italians has a negative and strongly significant 
effect on the votes for the NL. As stated in section 2.6.2.2, the estimation with LLS fixed 
effects is very demanding, both in terms of residual variability of the dependent variable 
and loss of degrees of freedom (there are 57 LLS). This also suggests that – when 
accounting for specificities in the local labor systems – the effect of immigration becomes 
less relevant. 
    When we run IV estimates for the specifications of Table 2.6, we completely loose 
significance, also due to the high number of variables to instrument (see Table B.2). The 
joint test of significance fails for each of the channel, suggesting that neither of them plays 
a relevant role in determining the different voting behavior between the national and 
regional level of elections. 
2.8 Conclusions 
Immigration has shown to be an important determinant of the growing support for 
populist parties all over Europe, as many authors have already pointed out. We confirm 
this result arguing that immigration fosters the support for anti-immigrant parties through 
three channels: (1) “ideological” anti-immigrant feelings; (2) crowding-out effect; (3) labor-
market competition. There is not only an ideological anti-immigrant component to the 
                                                          
23 The F is 2.72 with a corresponding p-value of 0.0528 for the specification of column (2). 
24 The F is 2.19 and the corresponding p-value is 0.0988 for the specification of column (4). 
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votes for the NL, but there are other important economic factors that play a role. These 
economic variables can help explaining a relevant share of variability in the difference share 
of votes collected by the NL across different levels of government, suggesting that voters 
take them into account when choosing who to vote for at different elections. After 
controlling for the ideological channel, our results suggest that the competition on the 
labor market dominates the crowding out effect. 
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Table B.1 - Effect of immigration on the variation of the share of votes for the Northern League at 
the House's elections between 2008 and 2013 - Share variation specification 
     
VARIABLES 
Dependent variable: Delta NL share of votes 
2013-2008, House elections 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Share of immigrants 0.232*** 1.291** 0.788 0.851 
 
(0.0506) (0.582) (0.644) (0.542) 
Immigration growth rate over 5 years -0.00260 -0.00215 -0.00213 -0.00201 
 
(0.00316) (0.00322) (0.00319) (0.00175) 
Ln Italians avg income -0.0291** -0.0310** -0.0381** 0.0133 
 
(0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0167) (0.0180) 
Ln Δ median income Ita-Imm 0.00789* 0.0158** 0.0210*** 0.0178*** 
 
(0.00395) (0.00645) (0.00545) (0.00624) 
Ln(Δ med income Ita-Imm) × Imm share 
 
-0.114* -0.198*** -0.141* 
  
(0.0631) (0.0607) (0.0722) 
Italians empl. rate by LLS 
  
-0.109 
 
   
(0.0907) 
 Employment rate blls × Imm share 
  
1.873** 
 
   
(0.913) 
 Municipal Italians empl. rate 
   
-0.186*** 
    
(0.0550) 
Employment rate bm × Imm share 
   
0.736 
    
(0.492) 
Town with Pop>15k 0.0123* 0.0132** 0.0121* 0.00727** 
 
(0.00658) (0.00649) (0.00633) (0.00324) 
Constant 0.289** 0.233 0.335** -0.234 
 
(0.143) (0.160) (0.161) (0.171) 
     Socio-economical controls YES YES YES YES 
Local labor system fixed effects NO NO NO YES 
     Observations 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 
R-squared 0.127 0.131 0.140 0.063 
Number of LLS 
   
57 
     Notes: Clustered (at the LLS level) s.e. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B.2 - Effect of the COEC and LMC on the difference of the share of votes for the Northern 
League between the House and Regional elections in 2013 - IV estimates 
VARIABLES 
Dependent variable: Difference in NL share of 
votes House vs Regional elections, 2013 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Share of immigrants -13.03 -5.525 -4.655 -3.111 
 
(82.00) (11.62) (9.549) (6.074) 
Immigration growth rate over 5 years -2.626 -1.032 -0.334 -0.0518 
 
(16.79) (2.207) (1.897) (0.922) 
Share of immigrants squared in 2012 0.0576 -1.210 1.253 0.819 
 
(6.664) (2.547) (1.457) (1.233) 
Ln Italians avg income -0.0517 -0.0933 -0.0540 -0.0846 
 
(0.128) (0.146) (0.0429) (0.0728) 
Ln Δ median income Ita-Imm -0.222 -0.107 -0.0392 -0.0231 
 
(1.211) (0.172) (0.129) (0.0515) 
Ln(Δ med income Ita-Imm) × Imm share 0.972 0.691 0.500 0.419 
 
(3.467) (0.851) (0.792) (0.539) 
Ln(Δ med income Ita-Imm) × Imm gr 5 years 0.376 0.153 0.00989 -0.0147 
 
(2.349) (0.313) (0.206) (0.113) 
Italians empl. rate by LLS -0.604 0.113 
  
 
(7.331) (0.845) 
  Employment rate blls × Imm share 7.577 -0.303 
  
 
(86.50) (11.61) 
  Employment rate blls × Imm gr 5 years -0.577 -0.319 
  
 
(2.968) (0.674) 
  Municipal Italians empl. rate 
  
-0.142 0.0212 
   
(0.796) (0.535) 
Employment rate bm × Imm share 
  
-0.0437 -1.136 
   
(5.175) (3.354) 
Employment rate bm × Imm gr 5 years 
  
0.520 0.384 
   
(1.200) (0.898) 
Town with Pop>15k -0.0971 -0.0367 -0.0189 -0.0117 
 
(0.627) (0.0829) (0.0547) (0.0216) 
Constant 2.692 1.873 
  
 
(15.12) (3.535) 
  Socio-economical controls NO YES NO YES 
Local labor system fixed effects NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,424 1,424 1,422 1,422 
Number of LLS fixed effects 
  
55 55 
 
    Notes: Clustered (at the LLS level) standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Instrumented 
variables in italics: the share of immigrants and its square are instrumented with the Card-instrument with base-year 
2003 and its square, respectively; the growth rate of immigrants is instrumented with the difference of the Card-
instruments with base-year 2003 and 1991. 
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Piling up catastrophes: medium and 
long-term effect of earthquakes1 
 
 
with Matteo Gamalerio, University of Warwick 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Natural disasters cause fatalities and destroy property and infrastructure in a way similar 
to wars. We focus our attention on a specific type of catastrophic event: highly destructive 
earthquakes in Italian history. Earthquakes are a pervasive phenomenon in Italy, especially 
in its southern regions. We wonder what are the long and medium-term effects of 
destructive and catastrophic earthquakes on economic and social development.  
To answer this question we analyze the long-term effect of earthquakes on economic 
development in a cross-section framework at the municipal level using a particularly rich 
                                                          
1 We are very grateful to Massimo Filippini, Patricia Funk, Mario Jametti, Giuliano Masiero, Giovanni Pica, Raphaël 
Parchet and all other researchers at IdEP (USI) for enduring and tireless support and advices. We also thank Saverio 
Simonelli for valuable comments. 
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dataset on historic earthquakes. Moreover, we investigate the medium-term effect of 
earthquakes on economic and social development over the last 150 years, in a panel 
framework at the regional level, thanks to a newly assembled dataset on historical socio-
economic data. 
Our research is also part of the vast literature assessing the existing development gap 
between the northern and southern Italian regions. The North and the South part of Italy 
differ considerably with respect to several socio-economic indicators, such as per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP), education, life expectancy and human development. The 
South of Italy also lags behind in terms of political and individual rights and it was already 
far behind the Centre-North even at the unification of the country2. 
Many explanations about the determinants of this North-South gap have been proposed 
over the years. Felice (2013) divides the explanations in two strands: the accusatorial thesis 
and the exculpatory one, for both of which there is a strong and a weak version. 
The accusatorial thesis points to the innate – if not genetic – differences of the southern 
people, specifically to their low cooperation ability, which dates back to the Norman 
domination of the Middle Ages. The exculpatory thesis argues – in its strong version – that 
the South of Italy is less developed because the North exploited it after the unification of 
the country in 1860. Moreover, this theory is based on the concept of “iattura” – bad luck 
– due to geographical disadvantages both in terms of lack of natural resources and distance 
to the big European markets.  
We are particularly interested in the latter explanation, since some scientists, such as the 
well-known geologist Mario Tozzi, argue that catastrophic earthquakes might even be 
among the main reasons of the South of Italy’s lower development. As he pointed out «the 
seismic crisis that hit Calabria intermittently for nearly a century – between 1702 and 1783 
– remains the most impressive sequence of earthquakes that has hit our country so far. [...] 
That seismic storm turned into a crisis that faded an entire people. A kind of paralysis that 
left the Calabrian people numb, even in their spirit: many let themselves die. The crisis of 
the South of Italy also begins there».3 
Inexplicably the earthquakes and the volcanic activity are nearly absent from the 
discussion of the determinants of the North-South gap, even if the two areas of the 
country are very different with respect to these aspects. Few scholars have investigated this 
                                                          
2 Cfr. Felice (2013) for very detailed statistical information on this. 
3 M. Tozzi, La Stampa, October 2016, 31. 
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topic focusing on different earthquakes. Barone and Mocetti (2013) and Belloc et al. (2016) 
focus on the economic and institutional effect of earthquakes in Italy, finding that the 
consequence of an earthquake depends very much on the quality of the pre-existing 
institutions. Their results are mixed as is the literature on links between natural disasters 
and economics, in which some authors find that the effects are positive and others find 
that they are negative. 
In this chapter we differentiate the long and medium term effect of earthquakes and try 
to find a link between these natural disasters and some measures of social capital, which is 
a well known determinant of the long term evolution of institutions, that are a key factor to 
economic development. Our results suggest that in the long-run destructive earthquakes 
seem to have a positive effect on the per-capita municipal disposable income. In the 
medium run, instead, only destructive earthquakes show a positive effect, as catastrophic 
ones seem to have a negative effect on the regional human development index. As a 
corollary, we find that the INGV seismicity classification is not particularly useful to 
understand the effect of earthquakes on the economic development, since it does not 
account properly for the way in which earthquakes lay out their medium and long-term 
effect on the economic system. 
The chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 revises the literature on the economic 
effects of natural disasters; section 3.3 details the debate about the North-South gap and 
the historical context; section 3.4 describes the Italian geological context; in section 3.5 we 
present our data and the measures of seismicity that we constructed; section 3.6 details our 
empirical model; section 3.7 presents our main empirical results and section 3.8 concludes.  
3.2 Literature review  
A wide strand of the literature on natural disasters has studied their effect on economic 
growth. Most of this literature has been developed using cross-country data and, as 
described by Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014), it has provided inconclusive evidence so far. 
Some papers find no effects for geophysical, geological and mild disasters (Skidmore and 
Toya, 2002; Raddatz, 2007; Cavallo et al., 2013; Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2013). Others find 
a positive effect for some types of disasters (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Skidmore and Toya, 
2002; Leiter et al., 2009; Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2010; Loayza et al., 2012; Fomby et al., 
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2013; Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2013). Finally, some of the studies show that natural 
disasters, and especially extremely large ones, have a negative effect on economic growth 
(Hochrainer, 2009; Noy, 2009; Strobl, 2011; Fisker, 2012; Cavallo et al., 2013; Felbermayr 
and Gröschl, 2014; Hsiang et al, 2014; Shabnam, 2014). 
The authors finding a positive effect of natural disasters on economic outcomes argue 
that these events act as a Schumpeterian creative destruction: the destruction of the older 
capital stock fosters a renovation of the equipment, which – in turn – determines the 
absorption of new technologies (Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2010). This leads to an increase in 
the rate of growth of total factor productivity (TFP), which supports GDP growth. 
Moreover there is a substitution from physical capital investments to human capital ones, 
which end up increasing the speed of human capital accumulation (Skidmore and Toya, 
2002). Usually the caveat to these findings is that only developed economies actually 
benefit from natural disasters, while the effect for developing countries is negligible. 
The scholars finding a negative effect argue that only big disasters have a significant 
effect and that it is fiercer on poorer countries, mainly due to five determinant factors: (i) 
quality of institutions, (ii) level of government spending, (iii) literacy rate, (iv) per-capita 
income and (v) degree of trade openness (Noy, 2009). Financial conditions seem to matter 
as well: countries with more reserves and receiving aid and inflows of remittances can react 
better to these type of shocks (Hochrainer, 2009; Noy, 2009; Felbermayr and Gröschl, 
2014). Hsiang et al. (2014) highlight that the negative effect might be small, but it is very 
persistent and within twenty years can result in a loss of 7.4% of per-capita income. Fisker 
(2012) focuses on the within-country effects, claiming that while the consequences of 
destructive earthquakes could be negligible at the country level, they are significant at the 
local level. 
Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014) argue that this inconclusive evidence about the effect of 
natural disasters on economic growth is due to the use of data from damage records of 
insurance companies. Indeed, the use of this form of data may lead to biased estimates, as 
selection into the database could be correlated with GDP. Contrary to most of the 
literature, they build a database of natural disasters using geophysical and meteorological 
information. Their data show a negative effect of disasters on economic growth. They also 
show that poor countries are hit more severely by geophysical disasters, while rich 
countries suffer more for meteorological events. 
85 
 
Another strand of the literature studies which factor can alter the consequence of 
natural disasters on economic outcomes. Among the studied causes, we identify the quality 
of political institutions, political revolutions/reforms and insurance payments. Cavallo et al. 
(2013), using a dataset covering 196 countries for the period 1970-2008 and synthetic 
control methods, show that only extremely large disasters have negative effects on 
economic outputs, both in the short and long-run. However, they also show that the effect 
is due to radical political revolutions following the disasters. Once they control for these 
political changes, even extremely large disasters do not have an effect on economic growth. 
Furthermore, Felbermayr and Gröschl (2014) show that international openness and 
democracy reduce the negative effect of natural disasters. 
Barone and Mocetti (2014) study the effect of two different earthquakes in two different 
regions of Italy. Using a synthetic control analysis, they show that short-term effects are 
negative in both regions. However, they demonstrate that, in the long-run, financial aid has 
diverging effects: in the region with higher pre-quake institutional quality, financial aid that 
follow the earthquake has a positive effect on GDP. The positive effect is due to an 
increase in technical efficiency via a disruptive creation mechanism. Conversely, in the 
region with lower pre-quake institutional quality, financial aid has a negative effect, as it 
stimulates corruption, distorts the markets and deteriorates social capital. Nguyen and Noy 
(2018), using data from the 2010-2011 New Zealand earthquake, find that insurance 
payments can contribute significantly to the economic recovery after an earthquake. 
The literature has also studied the effect of natural disasters on political institutions. 
Belloc, Drago and Galbiati (2016), using historical data from Italy, show that earthquakes in 
the period 1000-1300 delayed the transition from autocratic regimes to self-government 
(i.e. the commune) only in cities where the political and religious leaders were the same 
person, but not in cities where the two powers were distinct. 
More recently, the literature started to study the effect of natural disasters on fiscal 
policies. Deryugina (2017), using data from the U.S., shows that hurricanes lead to a 
substantial increase in non-disaster government transfers. The present value of this increase 
exceeds that of direct disaster aid. This result suggests that the fiscal costs of natural 
disasters have been underestimated and that victims in developed countries are better 
insured than previously thought. Belasen and Polachek (2008) find that, while the income 
of the average worker might increase after being hit by a strong hurricane, there is also a 
negative effect on employment, which leads to an increase in public spending. Noy and 
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Nualsri (2010) study the fiscal consequences of natural disasters using panel data for a wide 
set of countries and highlight how developed countries react in counter-cyclical manner to 
these shocks, while developing countries pro-cyclically decrease their public spending. This 
worsens the negative effects of natural disasters and suggests why their effect is so different 
between rich and poor countries. 
A recent branch of the literature studies how natural disasters affect individual 
economic behaviors and outcomes. Caruso and Miller (2015), using data from the Peruvian 
census, study the effect of the 1970 Ancash earthquake on individual human capital 
accumulation, 37 years after the shock. They show that individuals affected by the 
earthquake while in utero are less educated, fare far worse in the marriage market and 
become parents at younger age. They also show that natural disasters have negative effects 
in the long-run and provide evidence of intergenerational transmission of shocks. Gignoux 
and Menéndez (2016) analyze the long-term effects of earthquakes on individual economic 
outcomes. Using survey data from rural Indonesia, they find that, following an earthquake, 
individuals experience short term losses but recover in the medium run (i.e. 2-5 years), and 
show income and welfare gains in the long run (i.e. 6-12 years). The positive long run effect 
is due to external aid, which enables to reconstruct the stocks of productive assets (mainly 
farms), to improve public infrastructures and to recover productivity. 
Boustan et al. (2017), using a 90 year panel dataset from the U.S., study the effect of 
natural disasters on migration rates, house prices and local poverty rates. They find that 
severe disasters increase migration rates and lower house prices, while milder disasters have 
little effect. Kirchberger (2017), using survey data from Indonesia, studies the effect of 
earthquakes on individual labor market outcomes. More specifically, the paper shows that 
earthquakes can have a positive effect on wage growth in the agricultural sector. This 
positive result is due to workers moving from the agricultural sector to the construction 
sector, raising the marginal product and the wages of labor in agriculture. Cai and Song 
(2017), utilizing survey data from China, examine the effect of natural disasters on weather 
insurance adoption. More specifically, running experimental insurance games with farmers, 
they demonstrate that experiencing natural disasters have a positive effect on real insurance 
take-up. Besides that, they show that informing farmers about natural disasters probability 
has a positive effect on insurance take-up. Between the two treatments, they find that 
knowledge of disasters probability has a greater impact. 
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The literature has focused on the short and long-run effect of natural disasters in a very 
detailed way, even if with inconclusive results. However, little has been said about the 
channels through which natural disasters might affect – either positively or negatively – 
economic growth (Cavallo and Noy, 2009). An important contribution of ours to the 
literature is the attempt to relate the earthquakes to the formation of social capital, as a 
reaction to adverse events.   
 
3.3 Debate about the South development and 
historical context4 
The wide debate on the causes and origin of the North-South gap can be synthetized 
following the scheme proposed by Felice (2013).  
Starting with the accusatorial thesis, Putnam et al. (1994) – in their book on the 
evolution of institutions – attribute the cause of the low development of the South of Italy 
to a lack of social capital, giving foundations to the concept of “amoral familism” 
introduced by Banfield (1967). The stronger version of the accusatorial thesis is grounded 
on the excessive genetic variety, which can easily result into conflicts, while the weak one is 
based on the low level of social capital, which dates back to the late Middle Ages. Both 
versions find the southern people guilty for their status and leave, basically, no hope for 
solution, at least in the medium term. 
The exculpatory thesis argues – in its strong version – that the South of Italy is less 
developed because the North exploited it after the unification of the country in 1860. This 
idea finds its maximum expression in Aprile (2010) which charges the Piedmonteses of 
genocides similar to the Nazi ones and describes the Bourbon regime as an enlightened 
one. Daniele and Malanima (2011) support this theory with their estimates on the per 
capita GDP at the unification of Italy, even if more recent and accurate estimates 
contradict their findings. The weak version of the exculpatory theory is based on the 
concept of “iattura” – bad luck – due to geographical disadvantages. Earthquakes and 
natural disasters in general would clearly be part of this explanation. The exculpatory thesis 
                                                          
4 This section is based on Felice (2011) 
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tends then to declare innocent the southern society, either attributing the guilt to the North 
or highlighting the adverse environment. 
Fortunato (1973) was the first to mention this idea, arguing that the southern mountains 
are harsh and steep, the rains are unpredictable, there is a lack of plains and coasts to build 
ports and, finally, the flow of the rivers is irregular. All these elements, together with 
malaria, landslides, floods and earthquakes doomed the South of Italy to its “geographic 
fate”, on top of which there was the inadequacy and corruption of the local ruling classes. 
However, Fortunato’s conclusion was that the misery of the southern people was 
inevitable, due to the poverty of the nature. 
Another explanation of the North-South differences can be found in that the level of 
wealth inequality at the unification was much higher in the southern regions relative to the 
Centre-North. At that time the economy was mainly agricultural, hence the land property 
structure was the main determinant of inequality. In the North of Italy, the agricultural 
system was already evolving towards an entrepreneurial management of the lands, through 
intensive usage of the field, day workers, irrigation investments, chemic fertilization and 
with the integration between agriculture and manufacture. In the Centre of Italy the 
sharecropping was the most widespread agricultural practice and the entire family of the 
sharecropper was involved in running the farm.5  
On the contrary, the agricultural activities in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies were still 
mainly based on a feudal system. The barons and the baronial clergy had an enormous 
power and the latifundium was the norm. According to Villani (1973), in the continental 
southern regions – excluding the kingdom capital, Naples – more than 70% of the 
population depended from the barons, who were about 1‰. This agricultural structure also 
resulted in a different family structure: while in the Centre-North households were 
composed by many family units, in the South the households were mainly single family and 
that did not foster cooperation as it happened in the Centre-North. The peasants in the 
South kept being exploited by the barons even after the formal abolition of the serfdom in 
1806 (1812 in Sicily) and were extremely poor, living in a subsistence condition. 
Acemoglu (2005), in his work on the institutions, distinguishes the political and 
economic institutions in two types: inclusive and extractive. The former favor citizens’ 
involvement, which fosters economic growth but also civil and human development. The 
latter have the sole scope of extracting rents from the citizens to divert them in the hand of 
                                                          
5 Zamagni, 1990 and Romani, 1968. 
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few privileged individuals. The prevalence of the latifundium together with an extremely 
unequal wealth distribution in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies ended up generating 
extractive institutions. 
What is the relationship between the earthquakes and the southern institutions? A good 
example is provided by the case of “Cassa Sacra”, a fund created by the Bourbon 
government right after the quake of 1783. The lands of 250 Calabrian convents were 
confiscated in order to distribute them to the poor people at a discounted price. However, 
due to the corruption of the Bourbon officials, the lands ended up being acquired by the 
wealthiest. The quake destroyed the previous social system and posed the bases for a new 
one. Earthquakes have then been a cause of the latifundium diffusion and of the 
development of extractive institutions even more based on the baronial system.  
Italian unification has been an essential event in the XIX century. Contrarily to what 
happened in Germany, where Prussia – the most important German state – lead the 
unification, in Italy, it was the smaller Kingdom of Sardinia that fostered the unification of 
the peninsula. It is important to highlight the institutional context in which this unification 
is reached, because it allows us to underline what were the socio-economic and institutional 
differences at the time. Some authors, such as Daniele and Malanima (2011), suggest that 
the southern Italian region were actually as rich as the northern ones in 1860. However, 
more precise and recent historical statistics have shown that this was not the case, hence, it 
is crucial to understand where this differences originated from. 
The Kingdom of the two Sicilies – ruled by the Bourbon dynasty – had twice the 
population of the Kingdom of Sardinia and more soldiers (130,000 against 100,000), but it 
was still an absolute monarchy, lagging behind both on social and economic grounds. Very 
little reforms were put in place after the 1848 rebellion and, in the following years, 
restauration was ferocious. The agriculture was still extensive-based and the latifundium 
was widespread. The economic system was still dominated by the noble classes: the 
serfdom was abolished in 1806 in the continental part of the kingdom and in 1812 in Sicily. 
Nonetheless the baronial system kept playing a very strong influence on the economy. In 
order to avoid to further upset the population, the fiscal pressure was kept extremely low 
and, as a result, there had been very little investments in infrastructure and social reforms. 
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The smaller Kingdom of Sardinia, instead, was a dynamic constitutional monarchy6, led 
by the Earl of Cavour under the reign of Vittorio Emanuele II of Savoy. Deep reforms 
involved trade, finance, social and economic infrastructure, fostering agriculture and 
industrial development. The government put also in place a significant reform of justice 
and supported the separation between State and Church. The bourgeois and entrepreneur’s 
class were directly involved in government management. 
The two other major kingdoms in Italy were the Habsburg’s Lombardo-Veneto and the 
Grand Duchy of Tuscany under the Habsburg-Lorraine. These two kingdoms were 
moderately progressive governments: road and rail infrastructure were built, and there were 
reforms in trade and agriculture – especially with the introduction of the land registries; 
education was promoted and some autonomy to local authorities was granted, in particular 
in the Lombardo-Veneto. Finally, there was the Pope State, which was a very conservative 
one, but at that time it was already reduced to a territory smaller than the current Latium 
region.  
The differences between the Centre-North and the South of Italy are certified by the 
extension of the railroad and road networks, by the usage of the postal services, by the 
development of the banking and financial systems and by the literacy rate. Specifically, the 
meters of railroad per squared kilometer were 25 in Piedmont and Liguria, 10.6 in 
Lombardy and Veneto, 11.2 in Tuscany, 2.6 in the State of the Church and only 0.9 in the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The meters of road per squared kilometer were 645 in the 
North-West (Piedmont, Liguria and Lombardy), 538 in Tuscany and 130 in the South of 
Italy. As for the postal service, the received letters per capita were 6.1 in Piedmont and 
Liguria, 5.3 in Lombardy, 3.1 in Tuscany and 1.6 in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. This 
data – of course – is influenced by the much higher illiteracy rate of the southern regions: 
86% in 1861, against a national average of 63%. In Lombardy and Piedmont the literacy 
rate was nearly 50%. Lastly, according to the most recent and reliable estimates, the GDP 
per capita in the South of Italy was about 20% lower than in the Centre-North in 1871. 
The existence of this gap at the unification of the country is very important for our 
analyses, because it allows us to rule out the hypothesis that the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies was either richer, or as rich as the rest of Italy. Moreover, it suggest that the 
development gap was not due to the extractive institutions put in place by the Kingdom of 
Sardinia against the southern regions. In fact, the development gap of the South of Italy 
                                                          
6 After the adoption of the Albertinian Statute in March 1848. 
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became a matter of political discussion right after the unification: the first studies on the 
topic were completed by Leopoldo Franchetti in 1873 and 18747. Stated that the North-
South gap does not depend on the unification process, we can move to the following 
section, where we analyze the geological differences between the North and the South of 
Italy. 
3.4 Geological context 
Italy is amongst the most-seismic countries in the world, together with Japan, Chile, 
Alaska, Indonesia, Russia, Ecuador, China, Tibet, Peru and Mexico8. Italian earthquakes, 
despite not reaching the highest magnitude levels, turn out to be very destructive, due to 
the combination of two factors: low depth of the epicenter and a soil composition that 
magnifies the oscillation generated by the quakes. Coupling that with a scare quality of 
buildings results often in huge damages to things and high number of casualties. 
As an example, we mention the five most destructive Italian earthquakes of the last 
three centuries for number of casualties. The quake in Val D’agri (Basilicata), in 1857, had 
an estimated magnitude of 7.12 and caused 12,000 casualties. The earthquake of Monti 
Reatini and Aterno Valley, with a magnitude of 6.92, caused about 12-15,000 casualties in 
1703. The Avezzano (Abruzzo) quake of 1915, with its magnitude of 7.08 resulted in 
33,000 casualties. In 1783, the one in Pre-Aspromonte (Calabria and Sicily), with a 
magnitude of 7.03 caused 50,000 casualties. Finally, the 1908 quake in Messina and Reggio 
Calabria had a magnitude of 7.10 and caused 120,000 casualties: it was registered as the 
worst catastrophe for number of victims in Europe. 
It is straightforward to note how all these catastrophic events were concentrated in the 
South of Italy. This part of the country is indeed very different from the rest of the 
country, geologically speaking. Figure 3.1 shows the seismicity map of Italy elaborated by 
the National Institute of Seismology and Volcanology (INGV). Clearly, the most-seismic 
areas are concentrated in the South of the country – with the exception of Apulia – and in 
                                                          
7 Fenoaltea, L’economia italiana, cit., pp. 264-266 
8 The listed countries are the ones in which there have been the strongest earthquakes in the XX and XXI 
century, according to the United States Geological Survey. According to the same agency, the earthquakes 
causing the highest number of casualties happened in Haiti, China, Indonesia, Japan, Italy, Turkmenistan, 
Pakistan, India, Peru, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Guatemala, Morocco, Tajikistan and Nepal. 
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the North-Eastern region of Friuly Venezia Giulia. As for Sicily, the most-seismic areas are 
the North-East and North-West ones.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Italian seismicity map, 2014 
 
Source: National Institute of Seismology and volcanology 
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INGV divides the Italian territory into four categories according to seismic risk: very 
high, high, low and very low. Overall, nearly 35% of the Italian municipalities have a high 
or very high seismic risk, but their distribution is extremely heterogeneous across the 
nation, in particular for the municipality with a very high seismic risk. 54% of the 
municipalities with a high seismic risk are in the southern regions, but nearly three out of 
four (73%) of the municipalities with a very high seismic risk are in the South, as it can 
easily be seen in Table 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our dataset comprises a total of 5958 registered earthquakes, from 217 b.C. to 2002 
a.D., as reported in Table 3.2. If we divide them according to the Mercalli scale – that 
classifies the earthquakes with respect to their effects – we can see how 77% of the 
earthquakes involving casualties and a staggering 100% of the earthquakes causing 
catastrophic destruction happened in the South of Italy. However, it is not the case that 
there are no registered quakes in the Centre-North of the country: two thirds of the 
registered earthquakes actually happened in that part of Italy. Nonetheless, seismic events 
are not evenly distributed by intensity, with the strongest ones concentrated in the South of 
Italy. 
Table 3.2 – Number of registered earthquakes 
Category Description Center-north % South % 
1  non-perceived 2 100% 0 0% 
2  perceived by few 148 89% 18 11% 
3-5  perceived but no damages 2383 83% 480 17% 
6-7  damages to things 1217 62% 732 38% 
8-10  casualties 222 23% 742 77% 
11  catastrophic destruction 0 0% 14 100% 
12  apocalyptic destruction  0 0% 0 0% 
   Total earthquakes 3972 67% 1986 33% 
Table 3.1 – Municipalities and seismic risk 
 Seismic risk Center-North % South % 
  Very high 190 27% 515 73% 
  High 916 46% 1060 54% 
  Low 2869 96% 128 4% 
  Very low 1865 92% 172 8% 
 Total municipalities 5840 76% 1875 24% 
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The concentration of the strongest seismic events in the southern regions led us to 
wonder whether there was a connection between important earthquakes and long-term 
economic growth. Figure 3.2 maps the average incomes by municipality in 2008.  
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They are shown according to a reverse scale, i.e. the municipalities with lower incomes 
being marked with a darker nuance of green. It is straightforward to note how similar 
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 look like, except for the highly seismic areas of the Friuly Venezia Giulia 
and the southern part of Umbria. This observation, on the one hand seems to suggest a 
correlation between strong quakes and economic development, and on the other hand 
seems to point to a mediating role of institutions, as suggested by Belloc et al. (2016).   
3.5 Data and measures of seismicity 
3.5.1    Data 
We drew from three main sources to construct our dataset: (1) the National Institute of 
Statistics (ISTAT), (2) the National Institute of Seismology and Volcanology (INGV) and 
(3) several papers on historic economic data by E. Felice9. We constructed two datasets to 
analyze separately the long-term effect and the medium-term effect of earthquakes. 
Measuring the level of development is never an easy task, because there are many different 
indicators that can be used to describe it. Bearing this in mind, we tried to construct the 
widest possible set of indicators that are proxies for the socio-economic development. 
The first dataset is a cross section at the municipal level, that we used for our long-term 
analyses. From ISTAT we gathered data on three dependent variables: the per-capita 
disposable income in 2005, the number of firms per capita and the number of non-profit 
associations per capita, a variable that is often used as a proxy for social capital. Moreover, 
we collected data on municipal population, active population and elderly index for the year 
2005, that we will use as controls. From INGV we derived data on their updated index of 
seismicity (2015) and the historic records on Italian earthquakes from 217 b.c. and 2002 
a.d., comprising the date of the event, the location of the epicenter, the intensity of the 
quake – measured both with the Mercalli and the Richter scale – and the number of 
                                                          
9 From Felice and Vecchi, (2015), page 46, Table A.2, the GDP per capita from 1871 to 2009. From Felice 
(2009), page 7, Table 2, the VA per capita from 1881 to 2001. The hybrid HDI from 1871 to 2007 from 
Felice and Vasta (2015), page 52, Table 1. From Felice (2009), page 10, Table 5, the productivity per worker 
from 1871 to 2001. The total workforce from 1871 to 2001, from Felice (2009), page 14, Table 8. The 
agricultural employment from 1871 to 2001 from Felice, (2009), page 13, Table 7. Finally, from Felice, (2011), 
page 32, Table A.3, the pupulation growth from 1891 to 2001.  
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municipalities affected. Using these data we constructed a set of seismicity measures which 
will be discussed in detail in the next sub-section. 
The second dataset is a panel at the regional level ranging from 1860 to 2011. We 
collected data from a set of economic history papers by E. Felice. These data comprise: 
GDP per capita, value added per capita, a hybrid human development index, per worker 
productivity, share of workforce, share of agricultural employment and population growth. 
These historic data come from academic articles published between 2009 and 2016 and are 
state of the art data, constructed with the most complete sources and precise technique. 
Despite referring to different time intervals, these data are usually on a decade basis and 
allow us to construct a small panel dataset that we use to investigate the medium-term 
impact of earthquakes on social and economic development after the Italian unification. 
From INGV we got the usual historic data on earthquakes, focusing our attention to the 
quakes which happened between 1860 and 2002. 
 
3.5.2    Measures of seismicity  
Starting from the data provided by the INGV, we consider five measures of seismicity: 
(1) the simple measure of seismic risk released by INGV, (2) the number of registered 
earthquakes, (3) the number of earthquake swarms, (4) a comprehensive measure of 
seismicity, defined “treatment” and, finally, (5) a “weighted treatment”.  
The INGV seismic risk ranges from 1 – very high risk – to 4 – low seismic risk. This 
measure summarizes the seismic risk of each municipality based on the number, intensity, 
and time passed by the past earthquakes. The distribution of the seismic risk among the 
Italian macro areas is shown in Table 3.1, while Figure 3.1 provides a visual representation 
of it across the Italian municipalities. There is no counterpart for this indicator in the panel 
framework, given that it is not updated at each seismic event. 
Second, we count the number of past earthquakes, starting from a basic count of the 
number of quakes and then differentiating them depending on their intensity. Specifically, 
we define as “destructive” the quakes with a Richter intensity larger than 4.8 Mw – causing 
at least damages to things – and as “catastrophic” the quakes with a magnitude greater than 
6.5, i.e. causing casualties and catastrophic destruction. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of 
historic earthquakes according to the type of damage that they caused, differentiating 
between the Center-north and the South of Italy. To construct its regional counterpart, we 
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weighted each earthquake by the share of municipalities that had been hit in each region at 
that seismic event. 
The third measure that we consider introduces a more systematic accounting of the 
intensity of the quakes. We call it 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, and – for the long-term specification of our 
analysis – it is defined by the following formula: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖 = � 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑖 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (1)2002
𝑖=−217
 
where 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the number of earthquakes occurred at time 𝑡 in municipality 𝑖 and 
𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the associated Richter intensity scale. Clearly, in the medium-term 
specification of our analysis, this variable will account only for the earthquakes occurred in 
time-span at hand. As for the previous indicator, each quake has been weighted according 
to the share of involved municipalities. 
The fourth measure that we consider is a weighted treatment, computed according to 
the following formula: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖
𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖
= � 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖,(𝑖+1)−𝑖2002𝑖=−217  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (2) 
where 𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖,(𝑖+1)−𝑖 stands for the time passing between the seismic event at time 𝑡 
in municipality 𝑖 and the next one happening at 𝑡 + 1. The idea underlying this weighted 
formula is that if a quake happens before a municipality has fully recovered from the 
damages of the previous seismic event, the effect of the earthquake is going to be more 
severe. This measure – despite being quite rough – allows us to introduce a time dimension 
to the seismic events, giving more weight to the quakes happening close to one-another. 
There is no direct counterpart to this measure in a panel framework, which is why we 
decided to use it only in the cross-section analyses. 
Finally, to account directly for earthquake swarms, we construct the variable 
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑞𝑡_𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖, which counts the number of non-singular earthquakes, i.e. the 
ones happening less than 10 years after the previous one in the same local area. Unless 
there have been huge episodes of corruption, within ten years from the first quake a 
community should have had the time to fix the damaged buildings. Given the definition of 
this variable it would have been difficult to find a sound counterpart at the regional level, 
hence we do not consider it in the panel analyses. 
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 For the cross-section dataset, these five variables are computed over the entire time 
span of our dataset. On the other hand, – for the panel dataset – these variables account 
only for the quakes happened in the period before the realization of the dependent 
variable. Summary statistics for the cross-section and panel datasets are shown in Tables 
3.3 and 3.4 respectively.  
Table 3.3 - Descriptive statistics - Cross-section 
Variables Obs. Mean Standard deviation Min. Max. 
        
 
Dependent      
  
Income per capita 7958 13544 3049 5013 44949 
  
Firms per capita 8062 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.42 
  
Non-profit associations per capita 7922 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 
 
Explanatory      
  
INGV seismicity index 8062 2.86 0.93 1.00 4.00 
  
Total number of earthquakes 8062 5.90 8.58 0.00 142.00 
  
Time-span bw one eqk and the next 8062 69.57 117.09 0.00 1980.00 
  
# of destructive earthquakes (Richter) 8062 4.37 7.09 0.00 132.00 
  
# of catastrophic earthquakes (Richter) 8062 0.81 1.56 0.00 20.00 
  
# of earthquake swarms (Richter) 8062 3.50 6.80 0.00 120.00 
  
# of destructive eqk swarms (Richter) 8062 1.89 5.50 0.00 112.00 
  
# of catastrophic eqk swarms (Richter) 8062 0.20 0.63 0.00 6.00 
  
Destructive treatment (Richter) 8062 17.60 37.57 0.00 706.43 
  
Catastrophic treatment (Richter) 8062 3.89 9.47 0.00 87.97 
  
Weighted treatment (Richter) 8062 11.03 28.67 0.00 680.72 
  
Weighted destructive treatment (Richter) 8062 6.06 23.10 0.00 652.51 
  
Weighted catastrophic treatment (Richter) 8062 0.91 4.06 0.00 52.21 
 
Controls      
  
Resident population 8062 7034 42186 31 2733908 
  
Share of active population 8062 0.41 0.06 0.16 0.61 
  
Elderly index 8062 1.89 1.53 0.00 35.00 
  
Per-capita GDP in 1871 (regional) 8062 2074 351 1371 2997 
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Table 3.4 - Descriptive statistics - Panel 
Variables Observations Mean Standard deviation Min. Max. 
        
 
Dependent      
  
GDP per capita 240 10916 9732 1371 35220 
  
Value added per capita 190 6974 6997 905 25906 
  
Hybrid HDI 228 0.64 0.21 0.20 0.92 
        
  
Productivity per worker 171 0.97 0.23 0.42 1.67 
  
Workforce (%) 171 47.09 8.98 26.13 82.33 
  
Agricultural employment (%) 171 47.32 20.74 1.88 77.93 
  
Population growth (%) 190 0.54 0.28 0.06 1.49 
 
Explanatory 
     
  
# of destr. eqks (R) by r & p 280 0.36 0.48 0 2.66 
  
# of cat. eqks (R) by r & p 280 0.04 0.17 0 1.68 
  
Overall treatment (R) by r & p 280 2.52 3.28 0 16.63 
  
Destr. treatment (R) by r & p 280 1.63 2.55 0 15.18 
  
Cat. treatment (R) by r & p 280 0.04 0.72 0 12.03 
 
Summary statistics 
     
  
# of eqk by region 280 85.81 48.31 0 166 
  
# of eqk by r & p 280 6.65 6.85 0 49 
  
# of municipalities by region 280 363.28 362.93 0 1541 
  
Weighted # of eqk by r & p 280 0.46 0.58 0 2.89 
               
 
3.6 Empirical model 
Our empirical strategy is twofold: first, we analyze the long-term effect of cumulated 
earthquakes in a cross section setting at the municipal level; then, we investigate the 
medium-term effect of earthquakes on several development indicators in a panel, at the 
regional level, over 14 periods for the time-span 1860-2011.  
3.6.1  Long-term cross section analysis  
Our baseline specification is as follow: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑝 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (3) 
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where 𝑦𝑖 can be – depending on the specification – the natural logarithm of disposable 
income per capita (in thousand of euros), the number of firms per capita, or the number of 
non-profit associations per capita (as a proxy for social capital) in municipality 𝑖; 𝑥𝑖 is the 
explanatory variable of interest, which can be either the INGV seismicity index, or the total 
number of quakes that occurred in municipality 𝑖 between 217 a.C. and 2002; 𝑍𝑖 constitutes 
a set of demographic controls, including municipal population, the share of active 
population and the share of the elderly (the share of people older than 65 years); 𝛿𝑝 are 
provincial fixed effects. 
The previous regression is a bit too simplistic, because it differentiates neither for the 
quake’s intensity, nor for the time passing between one earthquake and the following one. 
Hence, we now move to a specification differentiating between the levels of 
destructiveness of the earthquakes: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑝 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (4) 
where 𝑑𝑖 is the number of destructive earthquakes, i.e. the ones causing physical damages 
to things and 𝑐𝑖 is the number of catastrophic ones, i.e. the earthquakes causing casualties. 
Despite being an improvement with respect to the baseline specification, the previous 
regression does not account for the specific intensity of each quake, which is why we 
introduce the 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 variable, which can be differentiated by intensity of the 
treatment. Hence, we get the following specification: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑝 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑡𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑡𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (5) 
Where 𝑡𝑑𝑖 and 𝑡𝑐𝑖 are the treatment of destructive and catastrophic earthquakes 
suffered by municipality 𝑖. This specification – while accounting for the specific intensity of 
each quake – does not consider the time span encompassing between one quake and the 
next one. To deal with this issue, we first introduce the concept of earthquake swarms, i.e. 
the quakes happening within a ten years’ time-span:  
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑝 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (6) 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑖 and 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖 are destructive and catastrophic earthquake swarms that hit 
municipality 𝑖. Finally, we weight each treatment by the time-span passing before the 
following shake, getting to the following specification: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑝 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (7) 
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where 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖 and 𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑖 are destructive and catastrophic treatments experienced by 
municipality 𝑖 in its history (see eq. 2).  
We acknowledge that these long-run specifications, despite having several measures of 
clearly exogenous treatments, are not sheltered from potential confounding factors acting 
systematically at the local level or affecting a particular area of the country in a specific 
period. That is why we move to a panel specification at the regional level for the period 
1860-2011. 
3.6.2  Medium-term panel analysis 
In the panel analyses we focused on the number of – either destructive of catastrophic – 
earthquakes hitting a region in a specific period and on their intensity. The panel setting 
allows us to take into account the time-invariant and region-specific unobservables and the 
time-varying unobservables that affect a specific period across all regions. First, we study 
the effect of the number of earthquakes hitting a region 𝑡 in a specific period 𝑡, according 
to the following specification: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑦𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼𝑟 + 𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑑𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑐𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (8) 
where 𝑦𝑟𝑖 can be – from regression to regression – the natural logarithm of the GDP per 
capita (in thousand of euros); the value added per capita (in thousand of euros); the hybrid 
human development index. 𝑑𝑟𝑖 and 𝑐𝑟𝑖 are – respectively – the number of destructive and 
catastrophic earthquakes hitting region 𝑡 in period 𝑡. Finally, 𝛼𝑟 and 𝑡𝑖 are regional and 
period fixed effects, respectively.  
The previous specification can be further improved accounting for the specific intensity 
of each quake: 
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗  𝑦𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼𝑟 + 𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑖  ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ (9) 
where 𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑖 and 𝑡𝑐𝑟𝑖 are the treatment hitting a region 𝑡 in period 𝑡 in a destructive or 
catastrophic way respectively. In this setting we ignore the seismic swarms because the rule 
that we used to define it overlaps with the time periods of the panel analyses for most of 
the time intervals. 
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3.7 Main econometric results 
The empirical results displayed in this section follow directly from the previous 
empirical model section. First, we show the cross-section long-term analyses together with 
some robustness checks, then we move to the medium-term panel analyses. Qualitatively 
speaking, our main results are in line with what previously found by Albala-Bertrand 
(1993), Skidmore and Toya (2002), Leiter et al. (2009), Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2010), 
Loayza et al. (2012), Fomby et al. (2013), Felbermayr and Gröschl (2013). Suffering strong 
earthquakes has a positive effect both on the long and medium-run economic growth; 
moreover, the same outcome emerges with respect to the evolution of social capital and 
the human development index.  
3.7.1 Long-term analysis 
The main cross-section results for the two economic outcomes considered – disposable 
income and firms per-capita – and for our measure of social capital – the number of non-
profit associations per capita – are shown in Table 3.5, Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 respectively. 
The results are very similar for the three dependent variables studied and the three tables 
have a parallel structure, hence we will contemporaneously analyze them referring to their 
column numbering and the corresponding regression equations.   
First, it is interesting to note how the INGV seismicity index has no effect (column 1, 
corresponding to equation 3), either on the long-run economic growth or on social capital 
development. However, this result is not very surprising, given that the INGV seismicity 
index measures the risk of being hit by an earthquake and not its actual realization. 
Nonetheless, as soon as we consider the raw number of earthquakes that hit each 
municipality, we find a positive and strongly significant10 result for each dependent variable 
(column 2, equation 3). When we disregard the non-destructive earthquakes and focus only 
on the destructive and catastrophic ones, we still find a positive effect. The destructive 
quakes are strongly significant for each dependent variable, while the catastrophic ones 
have a stronger effect on the disposable income per capita, but they are not or less 
significant in determining the number of firms per capita and the number of non-profit 
association per capita respectively (column 3, specification 4). However, when we measure 
                                                          
10 At the 1% level. 
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earthquakes more precisely with the treatment variable, we find a strong and significantly 
positive effect for both type of earthquakes on each of the three dependent variables 
(column 4, estimating equation 5). 
 
Table 3.5 - Long-term effect of earthquakes on average disposable income 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Ln of (Income per capita/1000) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
INGV seismicity index 0.00597 
     
 
(0.00736) 
     # of at least destr. eqks (R) 
 
0.00665*** 
    
  
(0.000548) 
    # of destr. eqks (R) 
  
0.00586*** 
   
   
(0.000582) 
   # of cat. eqks (R) 
  
0.0152*** 
   
   
(0.00373) 
   Destr. treatment (R) 
   
0.00112*** 
  
    
(9.99e-05) 
  Cat. treatment (R) 
   
0.00322*** 
  
    
(0.000521) 
  Destr. eqk swarms (R) 
    
0.00625*** 
 
     
(0.000585) 
 Cat. eqk swarms (R) 
    
0.0307*** 
 
     
(0.00711) 
 Weigh. destr. treatment (R) 
     
0.00111*** 
      
(0.000128) 
Weigh. cat. treatment (R) 
     
0.00212 
      
(0.00133) 
Resident population 5.62e-07*** 1.41e-08 6.98e-09 1.14e-07* 1.90e-07** 2.82e-07*** 
 
(1.68e-07) (4.30e-08) (4.59e-08) (5.83e-08) (7.47e-08) (1.03e-07) 
Active pop./total pop. 0.265** 0.257** 0.249** 0.267** 0.270** 0.273** 
 
(0.115) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.114) (0.115) 
Elderly index 0.0255*** 0.0260*** 0.0261*** 0.0259*** 0.0259*** 0.0257*** 
 
(0.00478) (0.00479) (0.00482) (0.00479) (0.00482) (0.00478) 
Constant 2.557*** 2.570*** 2.575*** 2.565*** 2.574*** 2.574*** 
 
(0.0662) (0.0528) (0.0524) (0.0529) (0.0535) (0.0540) 
       Provincial FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       Observations 7,958 7,958 7,958 7,958 7,958 7,958 
R-squared 0.576 0.605 0.606 0.599 0.592 0.585 
       Clustered standard errors (at the provincial level) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6 - Long-term effect of earthquakes on the number of firms per capita 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Number of firms per capita/1000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
INGV seismicity index 0.00121 
     
 
(0.00150) 
     # of at least destr. eqks (R) 
 
0.000567*** 
    
  
(5.55e-05) 
    # of destr. eqks (R) 
  
0.000574*** 
   
   
(7.05e-05) 
   # of cat. eqks (R) 
  
0.000497 
   
   
(0.000300) 
   Destr. treatment (R) 
   
0.000104*** 
  
    
(1.11e-05) 
  Cat. treatment (R) 
   
0.000244*** 
  
    
(3.68e-05) 
  Destr. eqk swarms (R) 
    
0.000565*** 
 
     
(6.12e-05) 
 Cat. eqk swarms (R) 
    
0.00257*** 
 
     
(0.000437) 
 Weigh. destr. treatment (R) 
     
0.000100*** 
      
(1.22e-05) 
Weigh. cat. treatment (R) 
     
0.000223*** 
      
(8.00e-05) 
Resident population 3.37e-08** -1.30e-08** -1.30e-08** -7.26e-09 2.01e-10 8.25e-09 
 
(1.36e-08) (5.75e-09) (5.71e-09) (5.49e-09) (6.04e-09) (7.88e-09) 
Active pop./total pop. 0.135*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 
 
(0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
Elderly index 0.00123*** 0.00126*** 0.00126*** 0.00126*** 0.00126*** 0.00124*** 
 
(0.000365) (0.000368) (0.000368) (0.000368) (0.000370) (0.000369) 
Constant 0.0185** 0.0222*** 0.0221** 0.0217** 0.0225*** 0.0225*** 
 
(0.00836) (0.00842) (0.00846) (0.00840) (0.00838) (0.00837) 
       Provincial FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       Observations 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 
R-squared 0.347 0.361 0.361 0.359 0.356 0.352 
       Clustered standard errors (at the provincial level) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7 - Long-term effect of earthquakes on non-profit associations per-capita 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Non-profit association p/c 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
INGV seismicity index -0.000284 
     
 
(0.000180) 
     # of at least destr. eqks (R) 
 
2.25e-05*** 
    
  
(5.52e-06) 
    # of destr. eqks (R) 
  
1.70e-05*** 
   
   
(6.41e-06) 
   # of cat. eqks (R) 
  
8.08e-05** 
   
   
(3.09e-05) 
   Destr. treatment (R) 
   
3.75e-06*** 
  
    
(1.00e-06) 
  Cat. treatment (R) 
   
1.48e-05*** 
  
    
(3.71e-06) 
  Destr. eqk swarms (R) 
    
2.11e-05*** 
 
     
(6.32e-06) 
 Cat. eqk swarms (R) 
    
0.000102** 
 
     
(3.98e-05) 
 Weighted destr. treatment (R) 
     
4.51e-06*** 
      
(1.34e-06) 
Weighted cat. treatment (R) 
     
1.03e-05* 
      
(5.93e-06) 
Resident population -1.23e-09* -3.07e-09** -3.12e-09** -2.74e-09** -2.47e-09** -2.37e-09** 
 
(6.50e-10) (1.42e-09) (1.40e-09) (1.28e-09) (1.20e-09) (1.13e-09) 
Active pop./total pop. -0.00215 -0.00229 -0.00234 -0.00226 -0.00225 -0.00223 
 
(0.00220) (0.00218) (0.00219) (0.00218) (0.00218) (0.00218) 
Elderly index 0.000572*** 0.000577*** 0.000577*** 0.000577*** 0.000576*** 0.000576*** 
 
(0.000110) (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000111) (0.000111) 
Constant 0.00856*** 0.00752*** 0.00755*** 0.00751*** 0.00753*** 0.00753*** 
 
(0.00111) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) 
       Provincial FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       Observations 7,922 7,922 7,922 7,922 7,922 7,922 
R-squared 0.391 0.391 0.391 0.391 0.391 0.391 
       Clustered standard errors (at the provincial level) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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If we consider the earthquake swarms, we find again a significantly positive for both 
type of earthquakes, with the catastrophic ones having a stronger impact (column 5, 
equation 6). Finally, if we weight the treatment by the time-span encompassing between 
one quake and the following, we always find a positive and significant effect of the 
destructive ones. Instead, the catastrophic ones – despite showing a strongly significant 
effect on the firms per capita – seem to have no effect neither on the long run disposable 
income per capita, nor on the number of non-profit association per capita (column 6, 
equation 7). 
All specifications include – as municipal controls – the resident population, the share of 
active population and the elderly index. The resident population shows a positive effect – 
even if not always significant – on disposable income, which is consistent with higher 
incomes in bigger municipalities. The effect on the number of firms per capita is unclear, 
changing sign and significance depending on the specification. Instead, it has a negative 
effect on the number of non-profit association per capita, suggesting that there is a higher 
concentration in smaller municipalities. The share of active population, as expected, has a 
positive effect on both the disposable income and the number of firms per capita. 
Conversely, it has a negative effect on the number of non-profit associations. Finally, the 
elderly index has a positive effect on each dependent variable, suggesting that the elderly 
are richer and that, if retired, participate more in non-profit associations. 
What effect do our analyses predict in practice? Being hit by an additional destructive 
quake is associated to 0.56% increase in disposable income. The effect on disposable 
income of an additional catastrophic one is nearly three times: 1.51%. A destructive 
earthquake is associated to a 0.74% increase in the number of firms per capita, while the 
impact of a catastrophic one is slightly less, 0.64%. The impact of an additional destructive 
temblor is an increase in the number of non-profit associations of about 0.3%, while a 
catastrophic quake has an impact, which is more than four times: an increase of 1.44%. 
In conclusion, as soon as we measure more precisely the earthquakes hitting a 
municipality we find a positive long-term effect both on the economic outcomes and on 
the social capital development. We are aware of the potential confounding factors that 
could bias the results in this cross section setting, in particular with respect to the 
disposable income per capita. Specifically, earthquakes could be correlated with some 
unobservables that were already at work before the unification of the country in 1860. 
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3.7.2 Robustness checks 
We address the potential endogeneity issue with a twofold strategy. First, we compute 
again our measures of seismicity considering only the earthquakes that took place after 
1872 and controlled for the regional GDP per capita in 1871, as reported in Table 3.8. If 
there was any pre-existing difference that we did not account for in our previous 
specification, in this way we believe that we can control at least for the unobservables 
correlated with the stock of earthquakes that took place before 1871. The regional GDP 
per capita in 1871 – as expected – is strongly significant, but this does not affect the 
significance of the coefficients associated to our measures of seismicity. This is reassuring, 
especially considering that – if anything – in these specifications, the coefficients are 
slightly larger.  
As a further robustness check, we run a falsification test at the regional level. 
Specifically, we used the regional GDP per capita in 1871 as our dependent variable and we 
computed our usual measures of seismicity at the regional level for the earthquakes taking 
place from 1872 onwards. Clearly, these earthquakes should not be correlated with the 
GDP per capita in 1871. Table 3.9 shows the results for these specifications: none of our 
seismicity measures is significant, as we would expect.  
We can then conclude that earthquakes actually play a positive and significant role in 
determining the current level of disposable per capita income. In the next sub-section we 
move to the panel specifications in order to study the medium-term impact of destructive 
and catastrophic earthquakes. 
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Table 3.8 - Long-term effect of earthquakes on avg disposable income - Sample post 1872 - Robustness [A] 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Ln of (Income per capita/1000) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
# of destructive eqks (R) 0.00868*** 
   
 
(0.000681) 
   # of catastrophic eqks (R) 0.0236*** 
   
 
(0.00656) 
   Destructive treatment (R) 
 
0.00172*** 
  
  
(0.000120) 
  Catastrophic treatment (R) 
 
0.00327*** 
  
  
(0.000729) 
  Destructive eqk swarms (R) 
  
0.00892*** 
 
   
(0.000648) 
 Catastrophic eqk swarms (R) 
  
0.0205*** 
 
   
(0.00665) 
 Weighted destructive treatment (R) 
   
0.00154*** 
    
(0.000160) 
Weighted catastrophic treatment (R) 
   
0.00313* 
    
(0.00171) 
Resident population 1.11e-07*** 1.38e-07*** 1.67e-07*** 2.38e-07*** 
 
(3.61e-08) (4.40e-08) (5.71e-08) (8.32e-08) 
Active population/total pop. 0.251** 0.266** 0.265** 0.267** 
 
(0.111) (0.112) (0.113) (0.114) 
Elderly index 0.0263*** 0.0260*** 0.0259*** 0.0257*** 
 
(0.00487) (0.00479) (0.00480) (0.00477) 
Ln of (GDP per-capita in 1871/1000) 3.482*** 3.061*** 2.956*** 2.662*** 
 
(0.135) (0.102) (0.0981) (0.0928) 
Dummy missing dep.var. 0.151*** 0.113*** 0.102*** 0.0754*** 
 
(0.0129) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0103) 
Constant -0.0409 0.266*** 0.359*** 0.581*** 
 
(0.0853) (0.0426) (0.0378) (0.0313) 
     Provincial FE YES YES YES YES 
     Observations 7,958 7,958 7,958 7,958 
R-squared 0.610 0.605 0.599 0.590 
     Clustered (at the provincial level) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.9 - Long-term effect of earthquakes on avg disposable income - REGIONAL sample post 1872                                    
Robustness [B] - Falsification test 
VARIABLES Dependent variable: Ln of (Income per capita/1000) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
# of destructive eqks (R) -0.0158 
   
 
(0.0347) 
   # of catastrophic eqks (R) 0.0721 
   
 
(0.169) 
   Destructive treatment (R) 
 
-0.00267 
  
  
(0.00559) 
  Catastrophic treatment (R) 
 
0.0136 
  
  
(0.0571) 
  Destructive eqk swarms (R) 
  
-0.0248 
 
   
(0.0373) 
 Catastrophic eqk swarms (R) 
  
0.0263 
 
   
(0.601) 
 Weighted destructive treatment (R) 
   
-0.00712 
    
(0.0104) 
Weighted catastrophic treatment (R) 
   
-0.0361 
    
(0.223) 
Dummy missing dep.var. 0.0146 0.0142 -0.00671 -0.0143 
 
(0.0679) (0.0721) (0.0802) (0.0749) 
Dummy North-East -0.0893 -0.120 -0.156 -0.158 
 
(0.160) (0.173) (0.191) (0.211) 
Dummy North-West 0.0276 -0.000966 -0.0513 -0.0586 
 
(0.259) (0.281) (0.288) (0.311) 
Dummy South -0.351 -0.347 -0.342 -0.329 
 
(0.270) (0.298) (0.273) (0.283) 
Dummy Islands -0.297 -0.321 -0.347 -0.339 
 
(0.285) (0.315) (0.301) (0.321) 
Constant 0.858** 0.885** 0.932** 0.936** 
 
(0.297) (0.318) (0.309) (0.329) 
     Observations 20 20 20 20 
R-squared 0.476 0.474 0.481 0.479 
     Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.7.3 Medium term analysis 
The panel analyses aim at studying the medium term effect of earthquakes at the 
regional level, taking also into account the share of municipalities that were actually 
affected by earthquakes in the period considered. The most important results of these 
analyses are shown in Table 3.10. The three main dependent variables of interest are the 
natural logarithm of the GDP per capita (in thousand of euros) and of the value added per 
capita (also in thousand of euros) and the hybrid Human Development index. Odd-
numbered columns refer to equation (4), while even-numbered ones are estimates of 
specification (5).  
 
Table 3.10 - Medium-term effect of earthquakes 
VARIABLES 
  Dependent variables: 
 
Ln of (Income                   
per-capita/1000) 
 
Ln of (value added                     
per-capita/1000) 
 
Hybrid Human 
Development Index 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
                    
# of destr. eqks (R) by r & p 
 
-0.00349 
  
-0.00153 
  
0.0195*** 
 
  
(0.0124) 
  
(0.0281) 
  
(0.00422) 
 # of cat. eqks (R) by r & p 
 
0.0777*** 
  
0.0349 
  
-0.0155** 
 
  
(0.0296) 
  
(0.0381) 
  
(0.00758) 
 Destr. treatment (R) by r & p 
  
-0.000585 
  
-0.00176 
  
0.00306*** 
   
(0.00238) 
  
(0.00497) 
  
(0.000838) 
Cat. treatment (R) by r & p 
  
0.0108*** 
  
0.00715*** 
  
-0.00249*** 
   
(0.00341) 
  
(0.00256) 
  
(0.000589) 
Dummy missing dep. var. 
 
-0.122** -0.127** 
 
-0.137*** -0.144*** 
 
0.00922 0.00553 
  
(0.0607) (0.0638) 
 
(0.0437) (0.0452) 
 
(0.00936) (0.00916) 
Constant 
 
0.705*** 0.706*** 
 
2.946*** 2.951*** 
 
0.272*** 0.272*** 
  
(0.0525) (0.0525) 
 
(0.0644) (0.0607) 
 
(0.0146) (0.0146) 
          Regional FE 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Period FE 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
          Observations 
 
240 240 
 
190 190 
 
209 209 
Number of regional codes 
 
20 20 
 
19 19 
 
19 19 
          Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Destructive earthquakes do not seem to play a role in the medium-term, at least for the 
evolution of the GDP and value added per capita. They show a negative coefficient, which, 
however, is not significant (columns 1 to 4). Catastrophic earthquakes, instead, keep on 
having a positive and significant effect, at least when they are measured as treatments and 
not simply counting the number of corresponding quakes. Quantitatively speaking, the 
effect of an additional catastrophic earthquake hitting a region is a 0.42% increase in GDP 
per capita. 
The results for the hybrid HDI deserve a particular attention: in both specifications 
(columns 5 and 6), they appear to be strongly significant, but with opposite sign of the 
coefficients. Destructive earthquakes have a positive impact in the medium term, while 
catastrophic ones have a significant negative effect in the medium term, suggesting that 
while destruction of things and buildings might gather people together and – in turn – 
support the HDI, the loss of human lives harms the HDI. Indeed an additional 
catastrophic quake is associated to a 3.6% decrease in the HDI. 
Lastly, we ran the same regression with respect to other four dependent variables: the 
productivity per worker, the share of workforce, the share of agricultural employment and 
the population growth rate (see Table 3.11). We detect only a positive effect of catastrophic 
earthquakes on the evolution of the share of agricultural employment. Considering the 
historic evolution of this variable across the Italian regions, it means that in the regions 
more affected by catastrophic quakes the share of agricultural employment fell slower. As 
for the other dependent variables, we found no significant result. 
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3.8 Conclusions  
The relationship between earthquakes and economic and social development in Italy has 
not been analyzed in a comprehensive manner so far – also due to the lack of historical 
data. Taking advantage of a newly assembled dataset, we investigate the long and medium 
term effect of destructive and catastrophic earthquakes on some economic and social 
indicators. 
Our results suggest that in the long-run earthquakes – both catastrophic and destructive 
– seem to have a positive effect on the per-capita municipal disposable income, the number 
of firms and the number of non-profit associations per capita. As a corollary, we find that 
the INGV seismicity classification is not very informative about the effect of earthquakes 
on the economic development, not accounting properly for the way in which earthquakes 
lay out their medium and long-term effect on the economic and social system. 
In the medium run, destructive earthquakes exhibit no effect on the regional GDP and 
value added per capita. Catastrophic ones, instead have a positive impact on the evolution 
of these two indicators. More surprising are the results for the hybrid HDI: both 
destructive and catastrophic quakes appear to be strongly significant, but with the former 
having a positive impact and the latter a negative one. This seem to suggest that while 
destruction of things and buildings might gather people together and – in turn – support 
the evolution of HDI, casualties harms the HDI.  
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